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Abstract
We develop a framework in which individuals’ preferences coevolve with their abilities
to deceive others about their preferences and intentions. Specifically, individuals are charac-
terised by (i) a level of cognitive sophistication and (ii) a subjective utility function. Increased
cognition is costly, but higher-level individuals have the advantage of being able to deceive
lower-level opponents about their preferences and intentions in some of the matches. In the
remaining matches, the individuals observe each other’s preferences. Our main result shows
that, essentially, only efficient outcomes can be stable. Moreover, under additional mild as-
sumptions, we show that an efficient outcome is stable if and only if the gain from unilateral
deviation is smaller than the effective cost of deception in the environment.
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1 Introduction
For a long time economists took preferences as given. The study of their origin and formation
was considered a question outside the scope of economics. Over the past two decades this has
changed dramatically. In particular, there is now a large literature on the evolutionary foundations
of preferences (for an overview, see Robson and Samuelson, 2011). A prominent strand of this
literature is the so-called “indirect evolutionary approach,” pioneered by Güth and Yaari (1992)
(term coined by Güth, 1995). This approach has been used to explain the existence of a variety
of “non-standard” preferences that do not coincide with material payoffs, e.g., altruism, spite, and
reciprocal preferences.1 Typically, the non-materialistic preferences in question convey some form
of commitment advantage that induces opponents to behave in a way that benefits individuals
with non-materialistic preferences, as described by Schelling (1960) and Frank (1987). Indeed,
Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2007) show that this kind of result is generic.
A crucial feature of the indirect evolutionary approach is that preferences are explicitly or
implicitly assumed to be at least partially observable.2 Consequently the results are vulnerable to
the existence of mimics who signal that they have, say, a preference for cooperation, but actually
defect on cooperators, thereby earning the benefits of having the non-standard preference without
having to pay the cost (Samuelson, 2001). The effect of varying the degree to which preferences
can be observed has been investigated by Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001), Ely and Yilankaya (2001),
Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007), and Herold and Kuzmics (2009). They confirm that the degree
to which preferences are observed decisively influences the outcome of preference evolution.
Yet, the degree to which preferences are observed is still exogenous in these models. In re-
ality we would expect both the preferences and the ability to observe or conceal them to be the
product of an evolutionary process.3 This paper provides a first step towards filling in the missing
1For example, Bester and Güth (1998), Bolle (2000), and Possajennikov (2000) study combinations of altruism,
spite, and selfishness. Ellingsen (1997) finds that preferences that induce aggressive bargaining can survive in a Nash
demand game. Fershtman and Weiss (1998) study evolution of concerns for social status. Sethi and Somanthan
(2001) study the evolution of reciprocity in the form of preferences that are conditional on the opponent’s pref-
erence type. In the context of the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Guttman (2003) explores the stability of
conditional cooperation. Dufwenberg and Güth (1999) study firm’s preferences for large sales. Güth and Napel
(2006) study preference evolution when players use the same preferences in both ultimatum and dictator games.
Koçkesen, Ok, and Sethi (2000) investigate survival of more general interdependent preferences in aggregative
games. Friedman and Singh (2009) show that vengefulness may survive if observation has some degree of in-
formativeness. Recently, Norman (2012) has shown how to adapt some of these results into a dynamic model
2Gamba (2013) is an interesting exception. She assumes play of a self-confirming equilibrium, rather than a
Nash equilibrium, in an extensive-form game. This allows for evolution of non-materialistic preferences even when
they are completely unobservable. An alternative is to allow for a dynamic that is not strictly payoff monotonic.
This approach is pursued by Frenkel, Heller, and Teper (forthcoming), who show that multiple biases (inducing
non-materialistic preferences) can survive in non-monotonic evolutionary dynamics even if they are unobservable,
because each approximately compensates for the errors of the others.
3On this topic, Robson and Samuelson (2011) write: “The standard argument is that we can observe preferences
because people give signals – a tightening of the lips or flash of the eyes – that provide clues as to their feelings.
However, the emission of such signals and their correlation with the attendant emotions are themselves the product
of evolution. [...] We cannot simply assume that mimicry is impossible, as we have ample evidence of mimicry from
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link between evolution of preferences and evolution of how preferences are concealed, feigned, and
detected.4 In our model the ability to observe preferences and the ability to deceive and induce
false beliefs about preferences are endogenously determined by evolution, jointly with the evolu-
tion of preferences. Cognitively more sophisticated players have positive probability of deceiving
cognitively less sophisticated players. Mutual observation of preferences occurs only in matches in
which such deception fails. This setup is general enough to encompass both the standard indirect
evolutionary model where preferences are always observed, and the reverse case in which more
sophisticated types always deceive lower types, as well as all intermediate cases between these
two extremes. We find that, generically, only efficient outcomes can be played in stable popula-
tion states. Moreover, we define a single number that captures the effective cost of deception
against naive opponents, and show that an efficient outcome is stable if and only if the gain from
a unilateral deviation is smaller than the effective cost of deception.
Overview of the Model. As is common in standard evolutionary game theory we assume an
infinite population of individuals who are uniformly randomly matched to play a symmetric normal
form game.5 Each individual has a type, which is a tuple, consisting of a preference component and
a cognitive component. The preference component is identified with a subjective utility function
over the set of outcomes (i.e. action profiles), which may differ from the objective payoffs (i.e.,
fitness) of the underlying game. The cognitive component is simply a natural number representing
the level of cognitive sophistication of the individual.6,7 The cost of increased cognition is strictly
positive.
When two individuals with different cognitive levels are matched, there is positive probability
(which may depend on the cognitive levels of both agents) that the agent with the higher level
deceives his opponent. For the sake of tractability, and in order not to limit the degree to which
the animal world, as well as experience with humans who make their way by misleading others as to their feelings,
intentions and preferences. [...] In our view, the indirect evolutionary approach will remain incomplete until the
evolution of preferences, the evolution of signals about preferences, and the evolution of reactions to these signals,
are all analysed within the model.” [Emphasis added] (pp. 14–15)
4The recent working paper of Gauer and Kuzmics (2016) presents a different way to endogenising the observ-
ability of preferences. Specifically, they assume that preferences are ex ante uncertain, and that each player may
exert a cognitive effort to privately observe the opponent’s preferences.
5It is known that positive assortative matching is conducive to the evolution of altruistic behaviour
(Hines and Maynard Smith, 1979) and non-materialistic preferences even when preferences are perfectly unob-
servable (Alger and Weibull, 2013; Bergstrom, 1995). It is also known that finite populations allow for evolution
of spiteful behaviours (Schaffer, 1988) and non-materialistic preferences (Huck and Oechssler, 1999). By assuming
that individuals are uniformly randomly matched in an infinite population, we avoid confounding these effects with
the effect of endogenising the degree of observability.
6The one-dimensional representation of cognitive ability reflects the idea that if one is good at deceiving others,
then one is more likely to be good also at reading others and avoiding being deceived by them. In this paper
we simplify this relation by assuming a perfect correlation between the two abilities, and leave the study of more
general relations for future research.
7Remark 7 in Section 2.2 presents an alternative interpretation of our model, according to which this cognitive
component represents the agent’s social status, rather than the agent’s ability to deceive other agents.
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higher levels may exploit lower levels, we model a strong form of deception. The deceiver observes
the opponent’s preferences perfectly, and is allowed to choose whatever she wants the deceived
party to believe about the deceiver’s intended action choice. A strategy profile that is consistent
with this form of deception is called a deception equilibrium. With the remaining probability (or
with probability one if both agents have the same cognitive level) there is no deception in the
match. In this case, we assume that each player observes the opponent’s preferences, and the
individuals play a Nash equilibrium of the complete information game induced by their subjective
preferences.
The state of a population is described by a configuration, consisting of a type distribution
and a behaviour policy. The type distribution is simply a finite support distribution on the set
of types. The behaviour policy specifies a Nash equilibrium for each match without deception,
and a deception equilibrium for each match with deception. In a neutrally stable configuration all
incumbents earn the same expected fitness, and if a small group of mutants enter they earn weakly
less than the incumbents in any focal post-entry state. A focal post-entry state is one in which
the incumbents behave against each other in the same way as before the mutants entered.
Main Results. We say that a strategy profile is (fitness-)efficient if it maximises the sum of
objective payoffs. Theorem 1 shows that in any stable configuration, any type θ¯ with the highest
cognitive level in the incumbent population must play an efficient strategy profile when meeting
itself. The intuition is that otherwise a highest-type mutant who mimics the play of θ¯ against
all incumbents while playing an efficient strategy profile against itself would outperform type θ¯ (a
novel application of the “secret handshake” argument due to Robson, 1990).
Next we restrict attention to generic games (i.e. games that result with probability one if
fitness payoffs are independently drawn from a continuous distribution) and obtain our first main
result: any stable configuration must induce efficient play in all matches between all types. The
idea of the proof can be briefly sketched as follows. We first show that any type θ in a stable
configuration must play an efficient strategy profile when meeting itself. Otherwise a mutant who
has the same level as θ and the same utility function as θ, but who plays efficiently against itself,
could invade the population. Next, we show that any two types must play an efficient strategy
profile. The intuition is that otherwise the average within-group fitness would be higher than the
between-group fitness, which implies instability in the face of small perturbations in the frequency
of the types: a type who became slightly more frequent would have a higher fitness than the other
incumbents, and this would move the population away from the original configuration.
The existing literature (e.g., Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007) has demonstrated that if players
perfectly observe each other’s preferences (or do so with sufficiently high probability), then only
efficient outcomes are stable. As was pointed out above, our model encompasses the limiting case
in which it is arbitrarily “cheap and easy” to deceive the opponent, i.e. the case in which the
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marginal cost of an additional cognitive level is very low, and having a slightly higher cognitive
level allows a player to deceive the opponent with probability one. A key contribution of the
paper is to show that even when it is cheap and easy to deceive the opponent, the seemingly mild
assumption of perfect observability, and Nash equilibrium behaviour, among players with the same
cognitive level is enough to ensure that stability implies efficiency.
In order to obtain sufficient conditions for stability we restrict attention to generic games
that admit a “punishment action” that ensures that the opponent achieves strictly less than the
symmetric efficient fitness payoff. For games satisfying this relatively mild requirement we fully
characterise stable configurations. We define the (fitness) deviation gain of an action profile to be
the maximal fitness increase a player may obtain by unilaterally deviating from this action profile
(this gain is zero if and only if the action profile is a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game). Next
we define the effective cost of deception in the environment as the minimal ratio between the cost of
an increased cognitive level and the probability that an agent with this level deceives an opponent
with the lowest cognitive level. Our second main result shows that an efficient action profile is the
outcome of a stable configuration if and only if its deviation gain is smaller than the effective cost
of deception. In particular, efficient Nash equilibria are stable in all environments, while non-Nash
efficient action profiles are stable only as long as the gain from a unilateral deviation is sufficiently
small.
Next, we note that non-generic games may admit different kinds of stable configurations. One
particularly interesting family of non-generic games is the family of zero-sum games, such as
the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. We analyse this game and characterise a heterogeneous stable
population (inspired by a related construction in Conlisk, 2001) in which different cognitive levels
coexist, players with equal levels play the Nash equilibrium of the underlying game, and players
with higher levels beat their opponents but this gain is offset by higher cognitive costs.
Finally, in Section 4 we discuss two extensions of the model (which are formally analysed in
Appendices B and D): (1) we relax the assumption that each agent perfectly observes the partner’s
preferences in matches without deception, and (2) we allow for type-interdependent preferences
(a` la Herold and Kuzmics, 2009), which are represented by utility functions that are defined over
both action profiles and the opponent’s type.
Further Related Literature. Our model is related to work in biology and evolutionary psy-
chology on the evolution of the “theory of mind” (Premack and Woodruff, 1979), specifically,
the “Machiavellian intelligence” hypothesis (Humphrey, 1976) and the “social brain” hypothe-
sis (Byrne and Whiten, 1998), according to which the extraordinary cognitive abilities of hu-
mans evolved as a result of the demands of social interactions, rather than the demands of
the natural environment: in a single-person decision problem there is a fixed benefit from be-
ing smart, but in a strategic situation it may be important to be smarter than the opponent.
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From an evolutionary perspective, there is a trade-off between the benefit of outsmarting the op-
ponent and the non-negligible costs associated with increased cognitive capacity (Holloway, 1996;
Kinderman, Dunbar, and Bentall, 1998). Our model incorporates these features.
There is a smaller literature on the evolution of strategic sophistication within game theory; see,
e.g., Stahl (1993), Banerjee and Weibull (1995), Stennek (2000), Conlisk (2001), Abreu and Sethi
(2003), Mohlin (2012), Rtischev (2016), and Heller (2015). Following these papers, we provide
results to the effect that different degrees of cognitive sophistication may coexist.
Robalino and Robson (2016) construct a model to demonstrate the advantage of having a
theory of mind (understood as an ability to ascribe stable preferences to other players) over learning
by reinforcement. In novel games the ascribed preferences allow the agents with a theory of mind
to draw on past experience whereas a reinforcement learner without such a model has to start over
again. Hopkins (2014) explains why costly signaling of altruism may be especially valuable for
those agents who have a theory of mind.
Robson (1990) initiated a literature on evolution in cheap-talk games by formulating the secret
handshake effect: evolution selects an efficient stable state if mutants can send messages that the
incumbents either do not see or do not benefit from seeing. Against the incumbents a mutant
plays the same action as the incumbents do, but against other mutants the mutant plays an action
that is a component of the efficient equilibrium. Thus the mutants are able to invade unless the
incumbents are already playing efficiently. See also the related analysis in Matsui (1991) and
Wiseman and Yilankaya (2001). We allow for deception and still find that efficiency is necessary
(though no longer sufficient) for stability. As pointed out by Wärneryd (1991) and Schlag (1993),
among others, problems arise if either the incumbents use all available messages (so that there is no
message left for the incumbents to coordinate on) or the incumbents follow a strategy that induces
the mutants to play an action that lowers the mutants’ payoffs below those of the incumbents. To
circumvent this problem, Kim and Sobel (1995) use stochastic stability arguments and Wärneryd
(1998) uses complexity costs. Similarly, evolution selects an efficient outcome in our model, where
the preferences also serve the function of messages.
We conclude by mentioning three other related strands of literature in which deception has
been implicitly studied: (1) the “strategic teaching” literature, which studies situations in which
sophisticated agents manipulate the learning input of opponents in order to change the beliefs and
future actions of these opponents (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Camerer, Ho, and Chong,
2002; Schipper, 2017, Section 8.11); (2) the “reputation” literature, in which a long-run player
manipulates the beliefs and behaviour of short-run opponents (see Mailath and Samuelson, 2006,
for a textbook exposition); and (3) non-equilibrium level-k analysis of games of conflict, where
agents can use pre-play communication to deceive naive opponents (see, e.g., Crawford, 2003).
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Structure. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The
results are presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we extend the model to deal with partial observ-
ability (formally analysed in Appendix D) and type-interdependent preferences (formally analysed
in Appendix B). We conclude in Section 5. Appendix A contains proofs not in the main text.
Appendix C formally constructs heterogeneous stable populations in specific games.
2 Model
We consider a large population of agents, each of whom is endowed with a type that determines
her subjective preferences and her cognitive level. The agents are randomly matched to play a
symmetric two-player game. A dynamic evolutionary process of cultural learning, or biological
inheritance, increases the frequency of more successful types. We present a static solution concept
to capture stable population states in such environments.
2.1 Underlying Game and Types
Consider a symmetric two-player normal form game G with a finite set A of pure actions and a
set ∆ (A) of mixed actions (or strategies). We use the letter a (resp., σ) to describe a typical pure
action (resp., mixed action). Payoffs are given by π : A × A → R, where π (a, a′) is the material
(or fitness) payoff to a player using action a against action a′. The payoff function is extended to
mixed actions in the standard way, where π (σ, σ′) denotes the material payoff to a player using
strategy σ, against an opponent using strategy σ′. With a slight abuse of notation let a denote the
degenerate strategy that puts all the weight on action a. We adopt this convention for probability
distributions throughout the paper.
Remark 1. Asymmetric interactions can be captured in our setup (as is standard in the litera-
ture; see, e.g., Brown and von Neumann, 1950; Selten, 1980; van Damme, 1987, Section 9.5) by
embedding the asymmetric interaction in a larger, symmetric game in which nature first randomly
assigns the players to roles in the asymmetric interaction.
We imagine a large population of individuals (technically, a continuum) who are uniformly
randomly matched to play the game G. Each individual i in the population is endowed with a type
θ = (u, n) ∈ Θ = U × N, consisting of preferences, identified with a von Neumann–Morgenstern
utility function, u ∈ U , and cognitive level8 n ∈ N. Let ∆ (Θ) be the set of all finite support
probability distributions on Θ. A population is represented by a finite-support type distribution
µ ∈ ∆(Θ). 9 Let C (µ) denote the support (carrier) of type distribution µ ∈ ∆(Θ). Given a type
8For tractability, we choose to work with a discrete set of cognitive levels. The main results in the paper can
be adapted to a setup in which the feasible set of cognitive efforts is a continuum, provided that we maintain our
focus on finite-support type distributions.
9Comment 6 in Section 2.2 explains why we restrict attention to finite-support type distributions.
7
θ, we use uθ and nθ to refer to its preferences and cognitive level, respectively.
In the main model we assume that the preferences are defined over action profiles, as in
Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007).10 This means that any preferences can be represented by a
utility function of the form u : A×A→ R. The set of all possible (modulo affine transformations)
utility functions on A× A is U = [0, 1]|A|
2
. Let BRu (σ
′) denote the set of best replies to strategy
σ′ given preferences u, i.e. BRu (σ
′) = argmaxσ∈∆(A) u (σ, σ
′).
There is a fitness cost to increased cognition, represented by a strictly increasing cognitive cost
function k : N→ R+ satisfying limn→∞ k (n) = ∞. The fitness payoff of an individual equals the
material payoff from the game, minus the cognitive cost. Let kn denote the cost of having cognitive
level n. Hence kθ = knθ denotes the cost of having type θ. Without loss of generality, we assume
that k1 = 0.
We would like to put forward two motivations for the assumption that there is an increasing
fitness cost of having a higher cognitive level. The first motivation is relevant to settings in which
the evolution of types is influenced by biological inheritance. There is a literature in biology and
biological anthropology showing that brain volume, especially neocortex volume, is correlated with
the size of social groups across species. Noting that brain tissue is metabolically costly, it has been
argued that the size of the brain (in particular the neocortex) is at least partially determined
by complexity of social organisation (see Dunbar, 1998, for a summary of the evidence and the
arguments), which is in line with the “Machiavellian intelligence” and “social brain” hypotheses
(Humphrey, 1976; Byrne and Whiten, 1997; Whiten and Byrne, 1988).
The second motivation is relevant also in setups in which types evolve as part of a social learn-
ing process. For concreteness, suppose that agents face two kinds of decision problems throughout
their lives: (1) individual (ecological) decision problems against nature, and (2) interactive (so-
cial) decision problems as represented by playing the underlying game G. Agents have limited
cognitive capacity. New agents who join the population face a trade-off between developing their
deception-related cognitive skills (which are helpful when playing the game G) and developing
other skills (which are helpful in the decision problems against nature). When a new agent joins
the population, his type θ = (uθ, nθ) determines how much effort the agent exerts in develop-
ing his deception-related cognitive ability nθ (while the remaining effort is exerted to develop the
other skills). The increasing cognitive cost function k (nθ) captures the agent’s loss due to his
sub-optimal performance in the decision problems against nature, which is induced by diverting
effort to developing his deception-related cognitive ability at the expense of developing the other
skills.
10In Appendix B, we study type-interdependent preferences, which depend on the opponent’s type, as in
Herold and Kuzmics (2009).
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2.2 Configurations
A state of the population is described by a type distribution and a behaviour policy for each type
in the support of the type distribution. An individual’s behaviour is assumed to be (subjectively)
rational in the sense that it maximises her subjective preferences given the belief she has about
the opponent’s expected behaviour. However, her beliefs may be incorrect if she is deceived by her
opponent. An individual may be deceived if her opponent is of a strictly higher cognitive level.
The probability of deception is given by the function q : N× N→ [0, 1] that satisfies q (n, n′) = 0
if and only if n ≤ n′.11 We interpret q (n, n′) as the probability that a player with cognitive level n
deceives an opponent with cognitive level n′. Specifically, when two players with cognitive levels n′
and n ≥ n′ are matched to play, then with a probability of q (n, n′) the individual with the higher
cognitive level n (henceforth, the higher type) observes the opponent’s preferences perfectly, and
is able to deceive the opponent (henceforth, the lower type). The deceiver is allowed to choose
whatever she wants the deceived party to believe about the deceiver’s intended action choice. The
deceived party best-replies given her possibly incorrect belief. For simplicity, we assume that if
the deceived party has multiple best replies, then the deceiver is allowed to break indifference, and
choose which of the best replies she wants the deceived party to play. Consequently the deceiver
is able to induce the deceived party to play any strategy that is a best reply to some belief about
the opponent’s mixed action, given the deceived party’s preferences.
Given preferences u ∈ U , let Σ (u) denote the set of undominated strategies, which are the set
of actions that are best replies to at least one strategy of the opponent (given the preferences u).
Formally, we define
Σ (u) = {σ ∈ ∆(A) : there exists σ′ ∈ ∆(A) such that σ ∈ BRu (σ
′)} .
We say that a strategy profile is a deception equilibrium if the strategy profile is optimal from
the point of view of the deceiver under the constraint that the deceived player has to play an
undominated strategy. Formally:
Definition 1. Given two types θ, θ′ with nθ > nθ′, a strategy profile (σ˜, σ˜
′) is a deception equilib-
rium if
(σ˜, σ˜′) ∈ arg max
σ∈∆(A),σ′∈Σ(uθ′)
uθ (σ, σ
′) .
Let DE (θ, θ′) be the set of all such deception equilibria.
With the remaining probability of 1 − q (n, n′) − q (n′, n) there is no deception between the
11One can extend our main results to a setup in which individuals with lower cognitive levels can deceive opponents
with higher cognitive levels with a sufficiently small probability. Specifically, assume that for each generic game,
there exists ǫ > 0, such that q (n, n′) < ǫ for each n ≤ n′ (instead of requiring q (n, n′) = 0). One can show that the
characterization of NSCs in Corollary 2 remains qualitatively the same. Namely, the only candidates to be NSCs
are configurations in which all agents have the minimal cognitive level, and all agents play the efficient action profile
in every match with no deception. These configurations are NSCs if the effective cost of defection is sufficiently low.
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players with cognitive levels n and n′, and they play a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by
their preferences. Given two preferences u, u′ ∈ U , let NE (u, u′) ⊆ ∆(A) × ∆(A) be the set of
mixed equilibria of the game induced by the preferences u and u′, i.e.
NE (u, u′) = {(σ, σ′) ∈ ∆(A)×∆(A) : σ ∈ BRu (σ
′) and σ′ ∈ BRu′ (σ)} .
We are now in a position to define our key notion of a configuration (following the terminology
of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007), by combining a type distribution with a behaviour policy, as
represented by Nash equilibria and deception equilibria.
Definition 2. A configuration is a pair (µ, b) where µ ∈ ∆(Θ) is a type distribution, and b =(
bN , bD
)
is a behaviour policy, where bN , bD : C (µ)×C (µ) −→ ∆(A) satisfy for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ) :
q (nθ, nθ′) + q (nθ′ , nθ) < 1 ⇒
(
bNθ (θ
′) , bNθ′ (θ)
)
∈ NE (θ, θ′) , and
q (nθ, nθ′)> 0⇔nθ > nθ′ ⇒
(
bDθ (θ
′) , bDθ′ (θ)
)
∈ DE (θ, θ′) .
We interpret bDθ (θ
′) (resp., bNθ (θ
′)) to be the strategy used by type θ against type θ′ when deception
occurs (resp., does not occur).
Given a configuration (µ, b) we call the types in the support of µ incumbents. Note that standard
arguments imply that for any distribution µ, there exists a mapping b : C (µ)×C (µ)→ ∆(A) such
that (µ, b) is a configuration. Given a configuration (µ, b) and types θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ), let πθ (θ
′| (µ, b))
be the expected fitness of an agent with type θ conditional on being matched with θ′:
πθ
(
θ′| (µ, b)
)
= (q (nθ, nθ′) + q (nθ′ , nθ))·π
(
bDθ
(
θ′
)
, bDθ′ (θ)
)
+(1− (q (nθ, nθ′) + q (nθ′ , nθ)))·π
(
bNθ
(
θ′
)
, bNθ′ (θ)
)
.
The expected fitness of an individual of type θ in configuration (µ, b) is
Πθ|(µ,b) =
∑
θ′∈C(µ)
µ (θ′) · πθ (θ
′| (µ, b))− kθ,
where µ (θ′) denotes the frequency of type θ′ in the population. Given a configuration (µ, b), let
Π(µ,b) be the average fitness in the population, i.e.,
Π(µ,b) =
∑
θ∈C(µ)
µ (θ) · Πθ|(µ,b).
When all incumbent types have the same expected fitness (i.e. Π(µ,b) = Πθ|(µ,b) for each θ ∈ C (µ)),
we say that the configuration is balanced.
A number of aspects of our model of cognitive sophistication merit further discussion.
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1. Unidimensional cognitive ability: In reality the ability to deceive and the ability to detect
preferences are probably not identical. However, both of them are likely to be strongly
related to cognitive ability in general, and more specifically to theory of mind and the abil-
ity to entertain higher-order intentional attitudes (Kinderman, Dunbar, and Bentall, 1998;
Dunbar, 1998). For this reason we believe that a unidimensional cognitive trait is a reason-
able approximation. Moreover, it is an approximation that affords us necessary tractability.
We connect the abilities to detect and conceal preferences with the ability to deceive, by as-
suming (throughout the paper) that one is able to deceive one’s opponent if and only if one
observes the opponent’s preferences and conceals one’s own preferences from the opponent.
2. Power of deception: Our definition of deception equilibrium amounts to an assumption
that a successful deception attempt allows the deceiver to implement her favourite strat-
egy profile, under the constraint that the deceived party does not choose a dominated ac-
tion from her point of view. Moreover, we assume that a player with a higher cognitive
level knows whether her deception was successful when choosing her action. These assump-
tions give higher cognitive types a clear advantage over lower cognitive types. Hence, in an
alternative model in which successful deceivers have less deception power, we would expect
the evolutionary advantage of higher types to be weaker than in our current model. Below
we find that (for generic games) in any stable state everyone plays the same efficient action
profile and has the lowest cognitive level.12 We conjecture that these states will remain stable
also in a model where successful deception is less powerful. We leave for future research the
analysis of feasible but less powerful deception technologies.
3. Same deception against all lower types: Our model assumes that a player may use different
deceptions against different types with lower cognitive levels. We note that our results remain
the same (with minor changes to the proofs) in an alternative setup in which individuals have
to use the same mixed action in their deception efforts towards all opponents.
4. Non-Bayesian deception: Note that a successful deceiver is able to induce the opponent to
believe that the deceiving type will play any mixed action σˆ, even an action that is never
played by any agent in the population. That is, deception is so powerful in our model that the
deceived opponent is not able to apply Bayesian reasoning in his false assessment of which
action the agent is going to play. We think of this assumption as describing a setting in
which the deceiver (of a higher cognitive type) is able to provide a convincing argument (tell
a convincing story) that she is going to play σˆ. From a Bayesian perspective one might object
that these arguments are signals that should be used to update beliefs. To this we would
respond that the stories told to a potential victim by different deceivers will vary across
12Thus, in our setup a cognitive arms race (i.e. Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis a` la Humphrey, 1976;
Robson, 2003) is a non-equilibrium phenomenon, or alternatively a feature of non-generic games.
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would-be deceivers, even across would-be deceivers with the same preferences. Hence no
individual will ever accumulate a database containing more than one or a handful of similar
arguments. The limited amount of data on similar arguments will preclude the efficient use
of Bayesian updating for inferring likely behaviour following different arguments. We are not
aware of the existence of a Bayesian model of deception that is satisfactory for our purposes.
We leave the development of such a Bayesian model to future research.
5. Observation and Nash equilibrium behaviour in the case of non-deception: It is difficult to
avoid an element of arbitrariness when making an assumption about what is being observed
when neither party is able to deceive the other. As in most of the existing literature on the
indirect evolutionary approach (e.g., Güth and Yaari, 1992; Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007,
Section 3), we assume that when there is no deception, then there is perfect observability
of the opponent’s preferences. In Section 4.1 we discuss the implications of the relaxation
of this assumption. We consider it to be an important contribution of our analysis that it
highlights the critical importance of the assumption made regarding observability, and the
resulting behaviour, in matches without deception.
We further assume that if two agents observe each other’s preferences then they play a Nash
equilibrium of the complete information game induced by their preferences. This assumption
is founded on the common idea that when agents are not deceived, then (1) over time they
adapt their beliefs (in a way that is consistent with Bayesian inference) about the distribution
of actions they face, conditional on their partners’ observed preferences, and (2) they best-
reply given their belief about their current partner’s distribution of actions. By contrast, as
discussed above, when agents are deceived they are unable to correctly update their beliefs
about their partner’s action (i.e. unable to use Bayesian inference to arrive at beliefs about
the opponent’s distribution of actions). Still, they are able to best-reply given their (possibly
false) beliefs about the deceiver’s action.
6. Continuum population and finite-support type distributions. Our model is intended to be a
simple approximation of a real-life environment that includes a large finite population, and
in which new agents who join the population, or existing agents who revise their choice of
type, typically choose to mimic one of the existing active types. As a result each active type
is played by several agents (rather than by a single agent), and for each active type there
is a positive probability of a match between agents who are endowed with this type. As is
common in the literature, for tractability, we assume a continuum population and an “exact
law of large numbers,” rather then a large finite population. We want all other aspects of
the model to be as close as possible to the real-life environment. Specifically, we want to
maintain the property that for each type, there is a positive probability of a match between
agents who are endowed with this type. In order to maintain this property, we have to
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assume that the distribution of active types has a finite support.13
7. Alternative interpretation of our model: social status. As suggested by one of the referees,
one can present an interesting interpretation of our model that describes social status, rather
than deception. According to this interpretation, the level nθ of type θ describes the social
status (like caste) of agents belonging to this type. When two players are randomly matched
to play a game, first a “social struggle” ensues. With a certain probability, the higher-
caste player prevails and enslaves the lower-caste opponent. This means he can dictate the
choice by the lower-caste opponent as long as the choice is undominated for this opponent.
Otherwise, they simply play the Nash equilibrium of the game (given by their preferences).
Maintaining a higher social status is costly in terms of fitness.
2.3 Evolutionary Stability
As discussed in the previous subsection, each agent in the population behaves in a way that max-
imises the agent’s subjective preferences induced by the agent’s type. By contrast, the distribution
of types in the population evolves according to the expected material fitness obtained by each type.
This evolutionary process is captured by the static solution concepts introduced in this subsection.
We consider dynamics in which types with higher expected fitness gradually become more
frequent. One example of such dynamics is the replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker, 1978),
which can be interpreted in terms of biological (asexual) reproduction or as social learning by
imitation (see Weibull, 1995, Chapter 3 for a textbook introduction). According to the latter
interpretation, an agent who has the opportunity to revise her choice or a new agent who joins the
population randomly chooses a member of the population as “mentor,” and imitates the mentor’s
type; the probability that an agent is chosen as a mentor is proportional to that agent’s fitness.
Recall that a neutrally stable strategy (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1982)
is a strategy that, if played by most of the population, weakly outperforms any other strategy.
Similarly, an evolutionarily stable strategy is a strategy that, if played by most of the population,
strictly outperforms any other strategy.
Definition 3. A strategy σ ∈ ∆(A) is a neutrally stable strategy (NSS) if for every σ′ ∈ ∆(A)
there is some ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that if ε ∈ (0, ε¯), then π˜ (σ′, (1− ε)σ + εσ′) ≤ π˜ (σ, (1− ε)σ + εσ′).
If weak inequality is replaced by strict inequality for each σ′ 6= σ, then σ is an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS).
It is well known that NSSs and ESSs correspond to Lyapunov stable and asymptotically stable
population states, respectively, under the replicator dynamics. That is, a population starting close
13More accurately, we need to assume that the set of active types is countable. All of our results hold under this
somewhat weaker assumption.
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to an NSS will always remain close to the NSS, and a population starting close to an ESS will
converge to the ESS (see, e.g., Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Thomas, 1985; Bomze and Weibull, 1995;
Cressman, 1997; Sandholm, 2010.)
We extend the notions of neutral and evolutionary stability from strategies to configurations.
We begin by defining the type game that is induced by a configuration.
Definition 4. For any configuration (µ, b) the corresponding type game Γ(C(µ),b) is the symmetric
two-player game where each player’s pure strategy space is C (µ), and the payoff to strategy θ,
against θ′, is πθ (θ
′| (µ, b))− kθ.
The definition of a type game allows us to apply notions and results from standard evolutionary
game theory, where evolution acts upon strategies, to the present setting where evolution acts upon
types. A similar methodology was used in Mohlin (2012). Note that each type distribution with
support in C (µ) is represented by a mixed strategy in Γ(C(µ),b).
We want to capture robustness with respect to small groups of individuals, henceforth called
mutants, who introduce new types and new behaviours into the population. Suppose that a
fraction ε of the population is replaced by mutants and suppose that the distribution of types
within the group of mutants is µ′ ∈ ∆(Θ). Consequently the post-entry type distribution is
µ˜ = (1− ε) ·µ+ ε ·µ′. That is, for each type θ ∈ C (µ)∪C (µ′), µ˜ (θ) = (1− ε) ·µ (θ)+ ε ·µ′ (θ). In
line with most of the literature on the indirect evolutionary approach we assume that adjustment
of behaviour is infinitely faster than adjustment of type distribution.14 Thus we assume that the
post-entry type distribution quickly stabilises into a configuration
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. There may exist many
such post-entry type configurations, all having the same type distribution, but different behaviour
policies. We note that incumbents do not have to adjust their behaviour against other incumbents
in order to continue playing Nash equilibria, and deception equilibria, among themselves. For
this reason, we assume (similarly to Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007, in the setup with perfect
observability) that the incumbents maintain the same pre-entry behaviour among themselves.
Formally:
Definition 5. Let (µ, b) and
(
µ˜, b˜
)
be two configurations such that C (µ) ⊆ C (µ˜). We say
that
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is focal (with respect to (µ, b)) if θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ) implies that b˜Dθ (θ
′) = bDθ (θ
′) and
b˜Nθ (θ
′) = bNθ (θ
′).
Standard fixed-point arguments imply that for every configuration (µ, b) and every type dis-
tribution µ˜ satisfying C (µ) ⊆ C (µ˜) , there exists a behaviour policy b˜ such that
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal
configuration.
Our stability notion requires that the incumbents outperform all mutants in all configurations
that are focal relative to the initial configuration.
14Sandholm (2001) and Mohlin (2010) are exceptions.
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Definition 6. A configuration (µ, b) is a neutrally stable configuration (NSC) if, for every µ′ ∈
∆(Θ), there is some ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all ε ∈ (0, ε¯), it holds that if
(
µ˜, b˜
)
, where µ˜ =
(1− ε) · µ + ε · µ′, is a focal configuration, then µ is an NSS in the type game Γ(µ˜,b˜). The
configuration (µ, b) is an evolutionarily stable configuration (ESC) if the same conditions imply
that µ is an ESS in the type game Γ(µ˜,b˜) for each µ
′ 6= µ.
We conclude this section by discussing a few issues related to our notion of stability.
1. In line with existing notions of evolutionary stability in the literature (in particular, the
notions of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007, and Alger and Weibull, 2013), we require the
mutants to be outperformed in all focal configurations (rather than requiring them to be
outperformed in at least one focal configuration). This reflects the assumption that the
population converges to a new post-entry equilibrium in a decentralised (possibly random)
way that may lead to any of the post-entry focal configurations. Thus the incumbents cannot
coordinate their post-entry play on a specific focal configuration that favors them.
2. In order to be consistent with the standard definition of neutral stability, we require the
incumbents to earn weakly more than the average payoff of the mutants. We note that all
of our results remain the same if one uses an alternative weaker definition that requires the
incumbents to earn weakly more than the worst-performing mutant.
3. The main stability notion that we use in the paper is NSC. The stronger notion of ESC is
not useful in our main model because there always exist equivalent types that have slightly
different preferences (as the set of preferences is a continuum) and induce the same behaviour
as the incumbents. Such mutants always achieve the same fitness as the incumbents in
post-entry configurations, and thus ESCs never exist. Note that the stability notions in
Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) and Alger and Weibull (2013) are also based on neutral
stability.15 In Section B we study a variant of the model in which the preferences may
depend also on the opponent’s types. This allows for the existence of ESCs.
4. Observe that Definition 6 implies internal stability with respect to small perturbations in the
frequencies of the incumbent types (because when µ′ = µ, then µ is required to be an NSS
in Γ(C(µ),b)). By standard arguments, internal stability implies that any NSC is balanced: all
incumbent types obtain the same fitness.
5. The stability notions of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) and Alger and Weibull (2013) con-
sider only monomorphic groups of mutants (i.e. mutants all having the same type). We addi-
tionally consider stability against polymorphic groups of mutants (as do Herold and Kuzmics,
15In their stability analysis of homo hamiltonensis preferences Alger and Weibull (2013) disregard mutants who
are behaviourally indistinguishable from homo hamiltonensis upon entry.
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2009). One advantage of our approach is that it allows us to use an adaptation of the well-
known notion of ESS, which immediately implies dynamic stability and internal stability,
whereas Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) have to introduce a novel notion of stability with-
out these properties. Remark 3 below discusses the influence on our results of using an
alternative definition that deals only with monomorphic mutants.
3 Results
3.1 Preliminary Definitions
Define the deviation gain of action a ∈ A, denoted by g (a) ∈ R+, as the maximal gain a player
can get by playing a different action in a population in which everyone plays a:
g (a) = max
a′∈A
π (a′, a)− π (a, a) .
Note that g (a) = 0 iff (a, a) is a Nash equilibrium.
Define the effective cost of deception in the environment, denoted by c ∈ R+, as the minimal
ratio between the cognitive cost and the probability of deceiving an opponent of cognitive level
one:16 17
c = min
n≥2
kn
q (n, 1)
.
We say that a strategy profile is efficient if it maximises the sum of fitness payoffs. Formally:
Definition 7. A strategy profile (σ, σ′) is efficient in the game G = (A, π) if π (σ, σ′)+π (σ′, σ) ≥
π (a, a′) + π (a′, a), for each action profile (a, a′) ∈ A2.
Note that our notion of efficiency is defined: (1) with respect to the fitness payoff (rather than
the agents’ subjective payoffs), similarly to the analogous definition of efficiency in Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya
(2007), and (2) with respect to the strategy profile played by the agents; by contrast, the definition
does not take into account the cognitive costs.
A pure Nash equilibrium (a, a) is strict if π (a, a) > π (a′, a) for all a′ 6= a ∈ A. Let πˆ =
maxa,a′∈A (0.5 · (π (a, a
′) + π (a′, a))) denote the efficient payoff, i.e. the average payoff achieved by
players who play an efficient profile.
16The minimum in the definition of c is well defined for the following reason. Let nˆ be a number such that
knˆ >
k2
q(2,1) (such a number exists because limn→∞ kn =∞). Observe that
kn
q(n,1) ≥ kn >
k2
q(2,1) for any n ≥ nˆ. This
implies that there is an n¯ such that 2 ≤ n¯ ≤ nˆ and n¯ = argminn≥2
kn
q(n,1) .
17We define the effective cost of deception only with respect to an opponent with a cognitive level of one because
we later show (Lemma 1 and Theorem 2) that the only candidate to be an NSC is a configuration in which all
agents have a cognitive level of one, and such a configuration is an NSC iff the effective cost of defection against
these incumbents with n = 1 is sufficiently large.
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An action a is a punishment action if playing it guarantees that the opponent will obtain less
than the efficient payoff, i.e. π (a′, a) < πˆ for each a′ ∈ A. Some of our results below assume that
the underlying game admits a punishment action.
Remark 2. Many economic interactions admit punishment actions. A few examples include:
1. Price competition (Bertrand), either for a homogeneous good or for differentiated goods,
where a punishment action is setting the price equal to zero.
2. Quantity competition (Cournot), either for a homogeneous good or for differentiated goods,
where the punishment action is “flooding” the market.
3. Public good games, where contributing nothing to the public good is the punishment action.
4. Bargaining situations, where the punishment action is for one side of the bargaining to insist
on obtaining all surplus.
5. Any game that admits an action profile that Pareto dominates all other action profiles (i.e.,
games with common interests).
Moreover, if one adds to any underlying generic game a new pure action that is equivalent to playing
the mixed action that min-maxes the opponent’s payoff (e.g., in matching pennies this new action
is equivalent to privately tossing a coin and then playing according to the toss’s outcome), then
this newly added action is always a punishment action.
Given a configuration (µ, b) let n¯ = maxθ∈C(µ) nθ denote the maximal cognitive level of the
incumbents. We refer to incumbents with this cognitive level as the highest types.
A deception equilibrium is fitness maximising if it maximises the fitness of the higher type in
the match (under the restriction that the lower type plays an action that is not dominated, given
her preferences). Formally:
Definition 8. Let θ, θ′ be types with nθ > nθ′ . A deception equilibrium (σ˜, σ˜
′) is fitness maximising
if
(σ˜, σ˜′) ∈ arg max
σ∈∆(A), σ′∈Σ(uθ′)
π (σ, σ′) .
Let FMDE (θ, θ′) ⊆ DE (θ, θ′) denote the set of all such fitness-maximising deception equilibria
of two types θ, θ′ with nθ > nθ′ . In principle, FMDE (θ, θ
′) might be an empty set (if there is no
action profile that maximises both the fitness and the subjective utility of the higher type). Our
first result (Theorem 1 below) implies that the preference of the higher type in any NSC are such
that the set FMDE (θ, θ′) is non-empty.
A configuration is pure if everyone plays the same action. Formally:
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Definition 9. A configuration (µ, b) is pure if there exists a∗ ∈ A such that for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ)
it holds that bNθ (θ
′) = a∗ whenever q (θ, θ′) < 1, and bDθ (θ
′) = a∗ whenever q (θ, θ′) > 0 . With a
slight abuse of notation we denote such a pure configuration by (µ, a∗), and we refer to b ≡ a∗ as
the outcome of the configuration.
In order to simplify the notation and the arguments in the proofs, we assume throughout this
section that the underlying game admits at least three actions (i.e. |A| ≥ 3). If the original game
has only two actions, then adding a third action, which is dominated by the other two actions,
allows all the arguments in the proof to work. More complicated (and less instructive) variants
of the proofs can also be applied to a game with two actions without adding a third, dominated
action.
3.2 Characterisation of the Highest Types’ Behaviour
In this section we characterise the behaviour of an incumbent type, θ¯ = (u, n¯), which has the
highest level of cognition in the population.18 We show that the behaviour satisfies the following
three conditions:
1. Type θ¯ plays an efficient action profile when meeting itself.
2. Type θ¯ maximises its fitness in all deception equilibria.
3. Any opponent with a lower cognitive level achieves at most the efficient payoff πˆ against type
θ¯.
Theorem 1. Let (µ∗, b∗) be an NSC, and let θ, θ¯ ∈ C (µ∗). Then: (1) if nθ¯ = n¯ then π
(
θ¯, θ¯
)
= πˆ;
(2) if nθ < nθ¯ = n¯ then
(
bD
θ¯
(θ) , bDθ
(
θ¯
))
∈ FMDE
(
θ¯, θ
)
; and (3) if nθ < nθ¯ = n¯ then π
(
θ, θ¯
)
≤ πˆ.
Proof Sketch (formal proof in Appendix A.2). The proof utilises mutants (denoted by θ1, θ2, θ3,
and θˆ, below) with the highest cognitive level n¯ and with a specific kind of utility function,
called indifferent and pro-generous, that makes a player indifferent between all her own actions,
but which makes the player prefer that the opponent choose an action that allows the player to
obtain the highest possible fitness payoff.
To prove part 1 of the theorem, assume to the contrary that π
(
bθ¯
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯
(
θ¯
))
< πˆ. Let a1, a2 ∈
A be any two actions such that (a1, a2) is an efficient action profile (i.e. 0.5·(π (a1, a2) + π (a1, a2)) =
πˆ). Consider three different mutant types θ1, θ2, and θ3, which are of the highest cognitive level
that is present in the population, and have indifferent and pro-generous utility functions. Suppose
18For tractability we assume that a configuration can have only finite support. Note, however, that there is some
sufficiently high cognitive level n such that kn > maxa,a′∈A π (a, a
′). As a result, even if one relaxes the assumption
of finite support, any NSC must include only a finite number of cognitive levels, also without the finite-support
assumption.
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equal fractions of these three mutant types enter the population.19 There is a focal post-entry
configuration in which the incumbents keep playing their pre-entry play among themselves, the
mutants play the same Nash equilibria as the incumbent θ¯ against all incumbent types (and the
incumbents behave against the mutants in the same way they behave against θ¯), the mutants
play fitness-maximising deception equilibria against all lower types, when mutants of type θi are
matched with mutants of type20 θ(i+1)mod 3 they play the efficient profile (a1, a2), and when two
mutants of the same type are matched they play the same way as two incumbents of type θ¯ that
are matched together. In such a focal post-entry configuration all mutants earn a weakly higher
fitness than θ¯ against the incumbents, and a strictly higher fitness against the mutants. This
implies that (µ∗, b∗) cannot be an NSC.
To prove part 2, assume to the contrary that
(
bD
θ¯
(θ) , bDθ
(
θ¯
))
6∈ FMDE
(
θ¯, θ
)
. Suppose
mutants of type θˆ enter. Consider a post-entry configuration in which the incumbents keep playing
their pre-entry play among themselves, and the mutants mimic the play of θ¯, except that they
play fitness-maximising deception equilibria against all lower types. The mutants obtain a weakly
higher payoff than θ¯ against all types, and a strictly higher payoff than θ¯ against at least one lower
type. Thus (µ∗, b∗) cannot be an NSC.
To prove part 3, assume to the contrary that π
(
θ, θ¯
)
> πˆ. This implies that against type θ¯,
type θ earns more than πˆ in either the deception equilibrium or the Nash equilibrium. Suppose
mutants of type θˆ enter. Consider a post-entry configuration in which the incumbents keep playing
their pre-entry play among themselves, while the mutants: (i) play fitness-maximising deception
equilibria against lower types, (ii) mimic type θ’s play in the Nash/deception equilibrium against
type θ¯ in which θ earns more than πˆ, and (iii) mimic the play of θ¯ in all other interactions. The
type θˆ mutants earn strictly more than θ¯ against both θˆ and θ¯. The mutants earn weakly more
than θ¯ against all other types. This implies that (µ∗, b∗) cannot be an NSC.
Remark 3. The first part of Theorem 1 (a highest type must play an efficient strategy profile when
meeting itself) is similar to Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya’s (2007) Proposition 2, which shows that
only efficient outcomes can be stable in a setup with perfect observability and no deception. We
should note that Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) use a weaker notion of efficiency. An action is
efficient in the sense of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) (DEY-efficient) if its fitness is the highest
among the symmetric strategy profiles (i.e. action a is DEY-efficient if π (a, a) ≥ π (σ, σ) for all
strategies σ ∈ ∆(A)). Observe that our notion of efficiency (Definition 7) implies DEY-efficiency,
but the converse is not necessarily true. The weaker notion of DEY-efficiency is the relevant one
in the setup of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007), because they consider only monomorphic groups
19One must have at least two different types of mutants, in order for the mutants to be able to play the asymmetric
profile (a1, a2). We preset a construction with three different mutant types in order to allow all mutant types to
outperform the incumbents (one can also prove the result using a constructions with only two different mutant
types, but in this case one can only guarantee that the mutants, on average, would outperform the incumbents)
20If i = 1 (resp., i = 2, i = 3), then θ(i+1) mod 3 = θ2 (resp., θ(i+1) mod 3 = θ3, θ(i+1) mod 3 = θ1).
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mutants; i.e. all mutants who enter at the same time are of the same type. A similar result would
also hold in our setup if we imposed a similar limitation on the set of feasible mutants. However,
without such a limitation, heterogeneous mutants can correlate their play, and our stronger notion
of efficiency is required to characterise stability.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is that a game that has only asymmetric efficient action
profiles does not admit any NSCs.
Corollary 1. If G does not have an efficient profile that is symmetric (i.e. if π (a, a) < πˆ for each
a ∈ A), then the game does not admit an NSC.
Remark 4. As discussed in Remark 1, any interaction (symmetric or asymmetric) can be embedded
in a larger, symmetric game in which nature first randomly assigns roles to the players, and then
each player chooses an action given his assigned role.21 Observe that such an embedded game always
admits an efficient symmetric action profile. In particular, if the efficient asymmetric profile in
the original game is (a, a′), then the efficient symmetric profile in the embedded game is the one
in which each player plays a as the row player and a′ as the column player.
3.3 Characterisation of Pure NSCs
In this subsection we characterise pure NSCs, i.e. stable configurations in which everyone plays
the same pure action in every match. Such a configuration may be viewed as representing the
state of a population that has settled on a convention that there is a unique correct way to behave.
We begin by showing that in a pure NSC all incumbents have the minimal cognitive level, since
having a higher ability does not yield any advantage when everyone plays the same action.
Lemma 1. If (µ, a∗) is an NSC, and (u, n) ∈ C (µ), then n = 1.
Proof. Since all players earn the same game payoff of π (a∗, a∗) , they must also incur the same
cognitive cost, or else the fitness of the different incumbent types would not be balanced (which
would contradict that (µ, a∗) is an NSC). Moreover, this uniform cognitive level must be level
1. Otherwise a mutant of a lower level, who strictly prefers to play a∗ against all actions, would
strictly outperform the incumbents in nearby post-entry focal configurations.
The following proposition shows that a pure outcome is stable iff it is efficient and its deviation
gain is smaller than than the effective cost of deception. Formally:
Proposition 1. Let a∗ be an action in a game that admits a punishment action. The following
two statements are equivalent:
(a) There exists a type distribution µ such that (µ, a∗) is an NSC.
(b) a∗ satisfies the following two conditions: (1) π (a∗, a∗) = πˆ, and (2) g (a∗) ≤ c.
21If the original game is symmetric, the role (i.e. being either the row or the column player) can be interpreted
as reflecting some observable payoff-irrelevant asymmetry between the two players.
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Proof.
1. “If side.” Assume that (a∗, a∗) is an efficient profile and that g (a∗) ≤ c. Let a˜ be a
punishment action. Consider a monomorphic configuration (µ, a∗) consisting of type θ∗ =
(u∗, 1) where all incumbents are of cognitive level 1 and of the same preference type u∗,
according to which all actions except a∗ and a˜ are strictly dominated, a˜ weakly dominates
a∗, and a∗ is a best reply to itself:
u∗ (a, a′) =


1 if a = a˜ and a′ 6= a∗
0 if a = a∗ or (a = a˜ and a′ = a∗.)
−1 otherwise.
Consider first mutants with cognitive level one. Observe that in any post-entry configuration
mutants with cognitive level one earns at most πˆ when they are matched with the incumbents,
and strictly less than πˆ if the mutants play any action a 6= a∗ with positive probability
against the incumbents. Further observe, that the mutants can earn (on average) at most πˆ
when they are matched with other mutants (because πˆ is the efficient payoff). This implies
that incumbents weakly outperform any mutants with cognitive level one in any post-entry
population.
Next, consider mutants with a higher cognitive level n > 1. Such mutants can earn at
most πˆ + g (a∗) when they deceive the incumbents and at most πˆ when they do not deceive
the incumbents (recall that π (a˜, a˜) + g (a˜) = maxa′π (a
′, a˜) < πˆ because a˜ is a punishment
action). Thus the mutants are weakly outperformed by the incumbents if
q (n, 1) · (g (a∗) + πˆ) + (1− q (n, 1)) · πˆ − kn ≤ πˆ ⇔ g (a
∗) ≤
kn
q (n, 1)
.
This holds for all n if g (a∗) ≤ c. Thus, the probability of deceiving the incumbents is at
most kn
g(a∗)
. The fact that g (a∗) ≤ c implies that the average payoff of the mutants against
the incumbents is less than πˆ + g (a∗) · kn
g(a∗)
≤ πˆ+kn, and thus if the mutants are sufficiently
rare they are weakly outperformed (due to paying the cognitive cost of kn). We conclude
that (µ, a∗) is an NSC.
2. “Only if side.” Assume that (µ, a∗) is an NSC. Theorem 1 implies that π (a∗, a∗) = πˆ. As-
sume that g (a∗) > c. The definition of the effective cost of deception implies that there
exists a cognitive level n such that kn
q(n,1)
< g (a∗). Lemma 1 implies that all the incumbents
have cognitive level 1. Consider mutants with cognitive level n and completely indifferent
preferences (i.e. preferences that induce indifference between all action profiles). Let a′ be
a best reply against a∗. There is a post-entry focal configuration in which (i) the incum-
bents play a∗ against the mutants, (ii) the mutants play a′ when they deceive an incumbent
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opponent and a∗ when they do not deceive an incumbent opponent, and (iii) the mutants
play a∗ when they are matched with another mutant. Note that the mutants achieve at least
πˆ + g (a∗) · q (n, 1) when they are matched against the incumbents. The gain relative to in-
cumbents, g (a∗) · q (n, 1), outweighs their additional cognitive cost of kn, by our assumption
that g (a∗) > c. Thus the mutants strictly outperform the incumbents.
3.4 Characterisation of NSCs in Generic Games
In this section we characterise NSCs in generic games, by which we mean games in which any two
different action profiles each give the same player a different payoff, and each yield a different sum
of payoffs.
Definition 10. A (symmetric) game is generic if for each a, a′, b, b′ ∈ A, {a, a′} 6= {b, b′} implies
π (a, a′) 6= π (b, b′) , and π (a, a′) + π (a′, a) 6= π (b, b′) + π (b′, b) .
For example, if the entries of the payoff matrix π are drawn independently from a continu-
ous distribution on an open subset of the real numbers, then the induced game is generic with
probability one.
Note that a generic game admits at most one efficient action profile. From Corollary 1 we know
that if the game does not have a symmetric efficient profile then it does not admit any NSC (and
as discussed in Remark 4, essentially every interaction admits a symmetric efficient profile). Hence
we can restrict attention to games with exactly one efficient action profile. Let a¯ denote the action
played in this unique profile.
Next we present our main result: all incumbent types play efficiently in any NSC of a generic
game.
Theorem 2. If (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC of a generic game with a (unique) efficient outcome (a¯, a¯), then
b∗ ≡ a¯, for all θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗); i.e. all types play the pure action a¯ in all matches.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that configuration (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC such that there are some
θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) such that bNθ (θ
′) 6= a¯ and q (θn, θn′)+q (θn′ , θn) < 1, or b
D
θ (θ
′) 6= a¯ and q (θn, θn′) > 0.
Let θ˚ be the type with the highest cognitive level among the types that satisfy at least one of the
following conditions:
(A) θ˚ plays inefficiently against itself, i.e. π
(
θ˚, θ˚
)
< πˆ.
(B) θ˚ and an opponent with a weakly higher type play an inefficient strategy profile, i.e. 0.5 ·(
π
(
θ˚, θ′
)
+ π
(
θ′, θ˚
))
< πˆ for some θ′ 6= θ˚ with nθ˚ ≤ nθ′ .
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(C) A strictly lower type earns strictly more than πˆ against θ˚, i.e. π
(
θ′′, θ˚
)
> πˆ for some θ′′ 6= θ˚
with nθ˚ > nθ′′ .
We will now successively rule out each of these cases.
Assume first that (A) holds. Let uˆ be a utility function that is identical to uθ˚ except that:
(i) the payoff of the outcome (a¯, a¯) is increased by the minimal amount required to make it a
best reply to itself, and (ii) the payoff of some other outcome is altered slightly (to ensure uˆ is
not already an incumbent) in a way that does not change the behaviour of agents. (The formal
definition of uˆ is provided in Appendix A.3.) Suppose that mutants of type θˆ = (uˆ, nθ) invade
the population. Consider a focal post-entry configuration in which the mutants mimic the play of
the type θ˚ incumbents in all matches except that: (i) the mutants play the efficient profile (a¯, a¯)
among themselves (which yields a higher payoff than what θ¯ achieves when matched against θ˚),
and (ii) when the mutants face a higher type they play either (a¯, a¯) or the same deception/Nash
equilibrium that the higher types play against θ¯. It follows that the mutants θˆ earn a strictly higher
payoff than θ˚ against θˆ, and a weakly higher fitness than type θ against all other types. Thus the
mutants strictly outperform the incumbents, which contradicts the assumption that (µ∗, b∗) is an
NSC. The full technical details of this argument are given in Appendix A.3.
Next, assume that case (B) holds and that case (A) does not hold. This implies that
0.5 ·
(
π
(
θ˚, θ′
)
+ π
(
θ′, θ˚
))
< πˆ = π
(
θ˚, θ˚
)
= π (θ′, θ′) .
That is, in the subpopulation that includes types θ˚ and θ′ the within-type matchings yield
higher payoffs than out-group matchings (an average payoff of less than πˆ). The following formal
argument shows that this property implies dynamic instability. The fact that (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC
implies that µ∗ is an NSS in the type game Γ(µ∗,b∗). Let B be the payoff matrix of the type game
Γ(µ∗,b∗) and let n = |C (µ
∗)|. It is well known (e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988, Exercise 6.4.3,
and Hofbauer, 2011, pp. 1–2) that an interior Nash equilibrium of a normal-form game is an NSS
if and only if the payoff matrix is negative semi-definite with respect to the tangent space, i.e. if
and only if xTBx ≤ 0 for each x ∈ Rn such that
∑
i xi = 0. Assume without loss of generality that
type θ˚ (θ′) is represented by the jth (kth) row of the matrix B. Let the column vector x be defined
as follows: x (j) = 1, x (k) = −1, and x (i) = 0 for each i /∈ {j, k}. That is, the vector x has all
entries equal to zero, except for the jth entry, which is equal to 1, and the kth entry, which is equal
to −1. We have
xTBx = Bjj −Bkj − Bjk +Bkk
= π (a¯, a¯)− kn
θ˚
+ π (a¯, a¯)− knθ′ −
(
π
(
bθ˚ (θ
′) , bθ′
(
θ˚
))
− kn
θ˚
+ π
(
bθ′
(
θ˚
)
, bθ˚ (θ
′)
)
− knθ′
)
= 2 · π (a¯, a¯)−
(
π
(
bθ˚ (θ
′) , bθ′
(
θ˚
))
+ π
(
bθ′
(
θ˚
)
, bθ˚ (θ
′)
))
> 0.
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Thus B is not negative semi-definite.
Finally, assume that only case (C) holds. Let θ¯ be an incumbent type with the highest cognitive
level. The fact that case (B) does not hold implies that π
(
θ¯, θ˚
)
= π
(
θ˚, θ¯
)
= πˆ. The fact that case
(C) holds implies that π
(
θ′′, θ˚
)
> πˆ, which implies that type θ˚ has an undominated action that can
yield a deceiving opponent a payoff of more than πˆ in a deception equilibrium. This contradicts
part (2) of Theorem 1, according to which we should have
(
bD
θ¯
(
θ˚
)
, bD
θ˚
(
θ¯
))
= FMDE
(
θ¯, θ˚
)
.
We have shown that no type in the population satisfies either (A), (B), or (C). The fact that no
type satisfies (A) implies that in any match of agents of the same type both agents play action a¯,
and the fact that no type satisfies (B) implies that in any match between two agents of different
types both players play action a¯.
Combining the results of this section with the above characterisation of pure NSCs yields the
following corollary, which fully characterises the NSCs of generic games that admit punishment
actions (as discussed in Remark 2, such actions exist in many economic interactions). The result
shows that such games admit an NSC iff the deviation gain from the pure efficient symmetric profile
is smaller than the effective cost of defection, and when an NSC exists, its outcome is the pure
efficient symmetric profile. In particular, in any game that admits an efficient symmetric pure
Nash equilibrium, this equilibrium is the unique NSC outcome, and in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
mutual cooperation is the unique NSC outcome iff the gain from defecting against a cooperator is
less than the effective cost of deception, and no NSC exists otherwise.
Corollary 2. Let G be a generic game that admits a punishment action. The environment admits
an NSC iff there exists an efficient symmetric pure profile (a∗, a∗) satisfying g (a∗) ≤ c (i.e. the
deviation gain is smaller than the effective cost of deception). Moreover, if (µ, b) is an NSC, then
b ≡ a∗, and n = 1 for all (u, n) ∈ C (µ).
Remark 5. Corollary 2 shows that generic games do not admit NSCs if the effective cost of deception
is less than the deviation gain of the efficient profile. In such cases the distribution of types
and their induced behaviour will not converge to a static population state. We leave the formal
analysis of environments that do not admit NSCs to future research. One conjecture for the
dynamic behaviour in such environments is a never-ending cycle between states in which almost
all agents are naive and play an efficient action profile, and states in which different cognitive levels
coexist, and agents play inefficient action profiles (see the related analysis of cyclic behaviour in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma with cheap talk and material preferences in Wiseman and Yilankaya, 2001).
Remark 6. Corollary 2 states that in an NSC of a generic game everyone has the same cognitive
level. One may wonder how this relates to the apparent cognitive heterogeneity in the real world.
Our analysis in this paper assumes a single underlying game, while in reality we face a potentially
infinite set of games. If an individual’s fitness is the result of interactions in a set of games that
includes generic games with an NSC as well as non-generic games (see Section 3.5) or generic
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games that do not admit any NSC (see previous remark), then evolution may lead to states in
which different cognitive levels coexist, possibly with a never-ending cycle between states with
different mixtures of cognitive levels.
Remark 7. Corollary 2 assumes that the underlying game admits a punishment action a˜, that gives
an opponent a payoff strictly smaller than the efficient payoff πˆ, regardless of the opponent’s play.
This punishment action is used in the construction of the NSC that induces the efficient action
a∗. Specifically, a non-deceived incumbent plays the punishment action a′ against any mutant
who does not always plays action a∗. If the game does not admit a punishment action, then (1)
a complicated game-specific construction of the way in which incumbents behave against mutants
who do not always play a∗ may be required to support the efficient action as the outcome of an
NSC, and (2) this construction may require further restrictions on the effective cost of deception,
in addition to g (a∗) ≤ c. We leave the study of these issues to future research.
3.5 Non-Pure NSCs in Non-generic Games
The previous two subsections fully characterise (i) pure NSCs and (ii) NSCs in generic games. In
this section we analyse non-pure NSCs in non-generic games. Non-generic games may be of interest
in various setups, such as: (1) normal-form representation of generic extensive-form games (the
induced matrix is typically non-generic), and (2) interesting families of games, such as zero-sum
games. Unlike generic games, non-generic games can admit NSCs that are not pure and that
may therefore contain multiple cognitive levels. To demonstrate this we consider the Rock-Paper-
Scissors game, with the following payoff matrix:22
R P S
R 0, 0 −1, 1 1,−1
P 1,−1 0, 0 −1, 1
S −1, 1 1,−1 0, 0
.
To simplify the analysis and the notations we assume in this subsection that a player always
succeeds in deceiving an opponent with a lower cognitive level, i.e. that q (n, n′) = 1 whenever
n>n′. The analysis can be extended to the more general setup.
The result below shows that, under mild assumptions on the cognitive cost function, this game
admits an NSC in which all players have the same materialistic preferences, but players of different
cognitive levels coexist, and non-Nash profiles are played in all matches between two individuals
22For the construction presented in this subsection to work, the underlying game must be non-generic. Observe
that if one slightly perturbs the payoffs of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game to make it a strictly competitive almost-
zero-sum generic game, then Corollary 2 applies, and the only candidate to be an NSC is a configuration in which
all agents have cognitive level one, and they all play an efficient action profile.
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of different cognitive levels. More precisely, when individuals of different cognitive levels meet, the
higher-level individual deceives the lower-level individual into taking a pure action that the higher-
level individual then best-replies to. Thus the higher-level individual earns 1 and her opponent
earns −1. Individuals of the same cognitive level play the unique Nash equilibrium. This means
that higher-level types will obtain a payoff of 1 more often than lower-level types, and lower-
level types will obtain a payoff of −1 more often than higher-level types. In the NSC this payoff
difference is offset exactly by the higher cognitive cost paid by the higher types. Moreover, the
cognitive cost is increasing and unbounded such that at some point the cost of cognition outweighs
any payoff differences that may arise from the underlying game. This implies that there is an
upper bound on the cognitive sophistication in the population.
Proposition 2. Let G be a Rock-Paper-Scissors game. Let upi denote the (materialistic) preference
such that upi (a, a′) = π (a, a′) for all profiles (a, a′). Assume that q (n, n′) = 1 whenever n 6= n′.
Further assume that the marginal cognitive cost is small but non-vanishing, so that (a) there is
an N such that kN ≤ 2 < kN+1, and (b) it holds that 1 > kn+1 − kn for all n ≤ N . Under these
assumptions there exists an NSC (µ∗, b∗) such that C (µ∗) ⊆ {(upi, n)}Nn=1, and µ
∗ is mixed (i.e.
|C (µ∗)| > 1). The behaviour of the incumbent types is as follows: if the individuals in a match
are of different cognitive levels, then the higher level plays Paper and the lower level plays Rock;
if both individuals in a match are of the same cognitive level, then they both play the unique Nash
equilibrium (i.e. randomise uniformly over the three actions).
Appendix C contains a formal proof of this result and relates it to a similar construction in
Conlisk (2001).
Our next result gives a lower bound to the fitness obtained in NSCs. Let M be the pure
maxmin value of the underlying game:
M = max
a1∈A
min
a2∈A
π (a1, a2) .
The pure maxmin value M is the minimal fitness payoff a player can guarantee herself in the
sequential game in which she plays first, and the opponent replies in an arbitrary way (i.e. not
necessarily maximising the opponent’s fitness.)
Proposition 3 shows that the pure maxmin value is a lower bound on the fitness payoff obtained
in an NSC. The intuition is that if the payoff is lower, then a mutant of cognitive level 1, with
preferences such that the maxmin action aM is dominant, will outperform the incumbents.
Proposition 3. If (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC then Π (µ∗, b∗) ≥M .
Proof. Assume to the contrary that Π (µ∗, b∗) < M . Let aM be a maxmin action of a player, which
guarantees that the player’s payoff is at least M
¯
, i.e. aM ∈ argmaxa1∈Amina2∈A π (a1, a2) .
26
Let uaM be the preferences in which the player obtains a payoff of 1 if she plays aM and a
payoff of 0 otherwise. Consider a monomorphic group of mutants with type (uaM , 1). The fact
that aM is a maxmin action implies that π(uaM ,1)
(
µ˜, b˜
)
≥ M in any post-entry configuration.
Furthermore, due to continuity it holds that Πθ
(
µ˜, b˜
)
< M for any θ ∈ C (µ) in all sufficiently
close focal post-entry configurations. This contradicts that µ∗ is an NSS in Γ(µ˜,b˜), and thus it
contradicts that (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC.
We conclude by demonstrating that the lower bound of the maxmin payoff is binding. Specif-
ically, Example 1 shows an NSC in a zero-sum game in which the fitness of the incumbents is
arbitrarily close to the lowest feasible payoff in the underlying game -1 (which is equal to the
maxmin payoff).
Example 1. Consider the Rock-Paper-Scissors game described above. Assume that k2 = 1, k3 > 2,
and q (2, 1) = 1. For each ǫ ∈ (0, 1), consider a population in which ǫ of the agents have cognitive
level 1, and the remaining 1− ǫ of the agents have level 2. The agents’ behaviour is according to
the behaviour described in Proposition 2, i.e.: (1) an agent of level 2 deceives a level-1 opponent
into taking a pure action that the level-2 agent then best-replies to; thus the level-2 agent earns 1
and her opponent earns −1; and (2) individuals of the same cognitive level play the unique Nash
equilibrium, and obtain a payoff of zero in the underlying game. When one takes into account the
cognitive cost k2 = 1 of the level-2 agents, this behaviour implies that all incumbents obtain a
fitness of ǫ−1. An analogous argument to the proof of Proposition 2 implies that this configuration
is an NSC.
4 Extensions
4.1 Partial Observability When There Is No Deception
As mentioned above, our basic model assumes perfect observability, and Nash equilibrium be-
haviour, in matches without deception. In what follows we briefly describe the results of a robust-
ness check that relaxes the first of these two assumptions. For brevity, we detail the full technical
analysis in Appendix D.
Specifically, we follow Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) and assume that in matches without
deception, each player privately observes the opponent’s type with an exogenous probability p,
and with the remaining probability observes an uninformative signal. This general model extends
both our baseline model (where p = 1) and Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya’s (2007) model (which can
be viewed as assuming arbitrarily high deception costs).
The main results of the baseline model (p = 1) show that (1) only efficient profiles can be NSCs,
and (2) there exist non-Nash efficient NSCs, provided that the cost of deception is sufficiently
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large. Our analysis shows that the former result (namely, stability implies efficiency) is robust to
the introduction of partial observability: (1) a somewhat weaker notion of efficiency is satisfied by
the behaviour of the incumbents with the highest cognitive level in any NSC for any p > 0, and
(2) in games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we show that only the efficient profile can be the
outcome of an NSC.
On the other hand, our analysis shows that our second main result (namely, the stability of
non-Nash efficient outcomes) is not robust to the introduction of partial observability. Specifically,
we show that: (1) non-Nash efficient profiles cannot be NSC outcomes for any p < 1 in games
like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, even when the effective cost of deception is arbitrarily large; and
(2) non-Nash efficient outcomes cannot be pure NSC outcomes in all games. If a game admits a
profile that is both efficient and Nash, then the profile is an NSC outcome for any p ∈ [0, 1]. If the
underlying game does not admit such a profile, then our results show that the environment does
not admit a pure NSC for any p ∈ (0, 1), and that games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma do not admit
any NSC. This suggests that in order to study stability in such environments one might need to
apply weaker solution concepts or to follow a dynamic (rather than static) approach.
4.2 Interdependent Preferences
In the main text we deal exclusively with preferences that are defined only over action profiles.
In what follows we briefly describe how to extend the analysis to interdependent preferences, i.e.
preferences that may also depend on the opponent’s type. A detailed formal analysis is presented in
Appendix B. Herold and Kuzmics (2009) study a similar setup while assuming perfect observability
of types among all individuals. Their key result is that any mixed action that gives each player a
payoff above her maxmin payoff can be the outcome of a stable configuration.23
Our main result for interdependent preferences in our setup shows that a pure configuration
is stable essentially iff: (1) all incumbents have the same cognitive level n, (2) the cost of level n
is smaller than the difference between the incumbents’ (fitness) payoff and the minmax/maxmin
value, and (3) the deviation gain is smaller than the effective cost of deception against an opponent
with cognitive level n. In particular, if the marginal effective cost of deception is sufficiently small,
then only Nash equilibria can be the outcomes of pure stable configurations, while if the effective
cost of deceiving some cognitive level n is sufficiently high (while the cost of achieving level n is
sufficiently low), then essentially any action profile is the outcome of a pure stable configuration
23Herold and Kuzmics (2009) expand the framework of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) to include interdepen-
dent preferences, i.e. preferences that depend on the opponent’s preference type. Under perfect or almost perfect
observability, if all preferences that depend on the opponent’s type are considered, then any symmetric outcome
above the minmax material payoff is evolutionarily stable. In our setting a pure profile also has to be a Nash equi-
librium in order to be the sole outcome supported by evolutionarily stable preferences. Herold and Kuzmics (2009)
find that non-discriminating preferences (including selfish materialistic preferences) are typically not evolutionarily
stable on their own. By contrast, certain preferences that exhibit discrimination are evolutionarily stable. Similarly,
evolutionary stability requires the presence of discriminating preferences also in our setup.
28
(similar to the result of Herold and Kuzmics, 2009, in the setup without deception).
The last part of Appendix B characterises stable configurations in the Hawk-Dove game. We
show that such games admit heterogeneous stable configurations in which players with different
levels coexist, each type has preferences that induce cooperation only against itself, and higher
types “exploit” lower types (and this is offset by their higher cognitive cost).
5 Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
We have developed a model in which preferences coevolve with the ability to detect others’ prefer-
ences and misrepresent one’s own preferences. To this end, we have allowed for heterogeneity with
respect to costly cognitive ability. The assumption of an exogenously given level of observability
of the opponent’s preferences, which has characterised the indirect evolutionary approach up until
now, is replaced by the Machiavellian notion of deception equilibrium, which endogenously deter-
mines what each player observes. Our model assumes a very powerful form of deception. This
allows us to derive sharp results that clearly demonstrate the effects of endogenising observation
and introducing deception. We think that the “Bayesian” deception is an interesting model for
future research: each incumbent type is associated with a signal, agents with high cognitive levels
can mimic the signals of types with lower cognitive levels, and agents maximise their preferences
given the received signals and the correct Bayesian inference about the opponent’s type.
In a companion paper (Heller and Mohlin, forthcoming) we study environments in which players
are randomly matched, and make inferences about the opponent’s type by observing her past
behaviour (rather than directly observing her type, as is standard in the “indirect evolutionary
approach”). In future research, it would be interesting to combine both approaches and allow the
observation of past behaviour to be influenced by deception.
Most papers taking the indirect evolutionary approach study the stability of preferences defined
over material outcomes. Moreover, it is common to restrict attention to some parameterised class of
such preferences. Since we study preferences defined on the more abstract level of action profiles we
do not make predictions about whether some particular kind of preferences over material outcomes,
from a particular family of utility functions, will be stable or not. It would be interesting to extend
our model to such classes of preferences. Furthermore, with preferences defined over material
outcomes it would be possible to study coevolution of preferences and deception not only in isolated
games, but also when individuals play many different games using the same preferences. We hope
to come back to these questions and we invite others to employ and modify our framework in these
directions.
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A Formal Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
A.1 Preliminaries
This subsection contains notation and definitions that will be used in the following proofs.
A generous action is an action such that if played by the opponent, it allows a player to achieve
the maximal fitness payoff. Formally:
Definition 11. Action ag ∈ A is generous, if there exists a ∈ A such that π (a, ag) ≥ π (a
′, a′′) for
all a′, a′′ ∈ A.
Fix a generous action ag ∈ A of the game G. A second-best generous action is an action such
that if played by the opponent, it allows a player to achieve the fitness payoff that is maximal
under the constraint that the opponent is not allowed to play the generous action ag. Formally:
Definition 12. Action ag2 ∈ A is second-best generous, conditional on ag ∈ A being first-best
generous, if there exists a ∈ A such that π (a, ag2) ≥ π (a
′, a′′) for all a′, a′′ ∈ A such that a′′ 6= ag.
Fix a generous action ag ∈ A, and fix a second-best generous action ag2 ∈ A, conditional on
ag ∈ A being first-best generous. For each α ≥ β ≥ 0, let uα,β be the following utility function:
uα,β (a, a
′) =


α a′ = ag
β a′ = ag2
0 otherwise.
Observe that such a utility function uα,β satisfies:
1. Indifference: the utility function only depends on the opponent’s action; i.e. the player is
indifferent between any two of her own actions.
2. Pro-generosity: the utility is highest if the opponent plays the generous action, second-highest
if the opponent plays the second-best generous action, and lowest otherwise.
Let UGI = {uα,β|α ≥ β ≥ 0} be the family of all such preferences, called pro-generous indifferent
preferences. Note that UGI includes a continuum of different utilities (under the assumption that
G includes at least three actions). Thus, for any set of incumbent types, we can always find a
utility function in UGI that does not belong to any of the current incumbents.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1 (Behaviour of the Highest Types)
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 1, Part 1
Assume to the contrary that π
(
bN
θ¯
(
θ¯
)
, bN
θ¯
(
θ¯
))
< πˆ. (Note that the definition of πˆ implies that
the opposite inequality is impossible.) Let a1, a2 ∈ A be any two actions such that (a1, a2) is an
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efficient action profile, i.e. 0.5 · (π (a1, a2) + π (a1, a2)) = πˆ. Let θ1, θ2, θ3 be three types that satisfy
the following conditions: (1) the types are not incumbents: θ1, θ2, θ3 /∈ C (µ
∗), (2) the types have
the highest incumbent cognitive level: nθ1 = nθ2 = nθ3 = n¯, and (3) the types have different pro-
generosity indifferent preferences; uθ1 , uθ2, uθ3 ∈ UGI and uθi 6= uθj for each i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Let
µ′ be the distribution that assigns mass 1
3
to each of these types. The post-entry type distribution
is µ˜ = (1− ǫ) · µ∗ + ǫ · µ′. Let the post-entry behaviour policy b˜ be defined as follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality: b˜Nθ (θ
′) = bNθ (θ
′) and b˜Dθ (θ
′) = bDθ (θ
′) for
each incumbent pair θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
2. The mutants play fitness-maximising deception equilibria against incumbents with lower
cognitive levels:
(
b˜Dθi (θ
′) , b˜Dθ′ (θi)
)
∈ FMDE (θi, θ
′) for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) with
nθ′ < n¯. Note that FMDE (θi, θ
′) is nonempty in virtue of the construction of UGI .
3. In matches without deception between mutants and incumbents, the mutants mimic θ¯ and
the incumbents play the same way they play against θ¯:
(
b˜Nθi (θ
′) , b˜Nθ′ (θi)
)
=
(
bN
θ¯
(θ′) , bNθ′
(
θ¯
))
,
for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
4. Two mutants of different types play efficiently when meeting each other: b˜Nθi
(
θ(i+1)mod 3
)
= a1
and b˜Nθi
(
θ(i−1)mod 3
)
= a2 for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
5. When two mutants of the same type meet, they play the same way θ¯ plays against itself:
b˜Nθi (θi) = b
N
θ¯
(
θ¯
)
for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
In virtue of point 1 the construction
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ∗, b∗)). By
points 2 and 3 each mutant θi earns weakly more than θ¯ against all incumbent types. By points
4 and 5 each mutant earns strictly more than θ¯ against the mutants. In total the average fitness
earned by each mutant is strictly higher than that of θ¯, against a population that follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
.
This implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗ in the population game Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗
is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS, in Γ(µ˜,b˜), which implies that
µ∗ is not an NSC.
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 1, Part 2
Assume to the contrary that
((
bD
θ¯
(θ) , bDθ
(
θ¯
)))
6∈ FMDE
(
θ¯, θ
)
. Let θˆ be a type that satisfies
the conditions of: (1) not being an incumbent: θˆ /∈ C (µ∗), (2) having the highest incumbent
cognitive level: nθˆ = n¯, and (3) having pro-generous indifferent preferences: uθˆ ∈ UGI . Let µ
′
be the distribution that assigns mass one to type θˆ. The post-entry type distribution is µ˜ =
(1− ǫ) · µ∗ + ǫ · µ′. Let the post-entry behaviour policy b˜ be defined as follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality: b˜Nθ (θ
′) = bNθ (θ
′) and b˜Dθ (θ
′) = bDθ (θ
′) ∀θ, θ′ ∈
C (µ∗).
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2. In matches with deception between mutants and incumbents , behaviour is such that the
mutants maximise their fitness:
(
b˜D
θˆ
(θ′) , b˜Dθ′
(
θˆ
))
∈ FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
for each θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) with
nθ′ < n¯.
3. In matches without deception between mutants and incumbents, the mutants mimic θ¯ and
the incumbents play the same way they play against θ¯:
(
b˜N
θˆ
(θ′) , b˜Nθ′
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bN
θ¯
(θ′) , bNθ′
(
θ¯
))
,
for each θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
4. The mutant θˆ plays against itself the same way θ¯ plays against itself:
(
b˜N
θˆ
(
θˆ
)
, b˜N
θˆ
(
θˆ
))
=(
b˜N
θ¯
(
θ¯
)
, b˜N
θ¯
(
θ¯
))
.
Note that
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ∗, b∗)) and that θˆ obtains a strictly higher
fitness than θ¯ against a population that follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This implies that µ′ is a strictly better
reply against µ∗ in the population game Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗ is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and
therefore it is not an NSS, in Γ(µ˜,b˜), which implies that µ
∗ is not an NSC.
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 1, Part 3
Assume to the contrary that π
(
θ, θ¯
)
> πˆ, which immediately implies that π
(
θ¯, θ
)
< πˆ and that
either π
(
b
|D
θ
(
θ¯
)
, bD
θ¯
(θ)
)
> πˆ or π
(
bNθ
(
θ¯
)
, bN
θ¯
(θ)
)
> πˆ. Let θˆ be a type that satisfies the conditions
of: (1) not being an incumbent: θˆ /∈ C (µ∗), (2) having the highest incumbent cognitive level:
nθˆ = n¯, and (3) having pro-generous indifferent preferences: uθˆ ∈ UGI . Let µ
′ be the distribution
that assigns mass one to type θˆ. The post-entry type distribution is µ˜ = (1− ǫ) · µ∗ + ǫ · µ′. Let
the post-entry behaviour policy b˜ be defined as follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality: b˜Nθ (θ
′) = bNθ (θ
′) and b˜Dθ (θ
′) = bDθ (θ
′) ∀θ, θ′ ∈
C (µ∗).
2. In matches with deception between mutants and incumbents, behaviour is such that the
mutants maximise their fitness:
(
b˜D
θˆ
(θ′) , b˜Dθ′
(
θˆ
))
∈ FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
for each θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) with
nθ′ < n¯.
3. In a match between a mutant θˆ and the incumbent θ¯, the mutant mimics θ, and the in-
cumbent θ¯ plays the same way it plays against θ:
(
b˜N
θˆ
(
θ¯
)
, b˜N
θ¯
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bNθ
(
θ¯
)
, bN
θ¯
(θ)
)
if
π
(
bNθ
(
θ¯
)
, bN
θ¯
(θ)
)
> πˆ, and
(
b˜N
θˆ
(
θ¯
)
, b˜N
θ¯
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bDθ
(
θ¯
)
, bD
θ¯
(θ)
)
otherwise.
4. The mutant θˆ plays against itself the same way θ¯ plays against itself:
(
b˜N
θˆ
(
θˆ
)
, b˜N
θˆ
(
θˆ
))
=(
b˜N
θ¯
(
θ¯
)
, b˜N
θ¯
(
θ¯
))
.
5. The mutant θˆ mimics θ¯ against all other incumbents without deception, and these incumbents
play against θˆ in the same way they play against θ¯:
(
b˜N
θˆ
(θ′) , b˜Nθ′
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bN
θ¯
(θ′) , bNθ′
(
θ¯
))
for
each θ′ 6= θ¯.
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Note that
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ∗, b∗)). By point 2 the mutant θˆ earns
weakly more than θ¯ against lower types. By point 3 and Theorem 1.1, the mutants earn strictly
more than θ¯ against type θ¯. By points 3 and 4 and Theorem 1.1, the mutant earns strictly more
than θ¯ against the mutant. By point 5 the mutant θˆ earns the same as θ¯ against all other types.
In total the average fitness earned by θˆ is strictly higher than that of θ¯, against a population that
follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. Recall (Remark 4 in Section 2.3) that all the incumbent types have the same fitness
in (µ∗, b∗). By a standard continuity argument, the fitness of incumbent θ¯ is arbitrarily close (for
a sufficiently small ǫ) to the fitness levels of any other incumbent type in the focal post-entry
configuration
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗ in the type game
Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗ is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS, in Γ(µ˜,b˜),
which implies that (µ∗, b∗) is not an NSC.
A.3 Proof of Case (A) in Theorem 2
In what follows we fill in the missing technical details for the part of the proof of Theorem 2 that
concerns case (A). We begin by proving a lemma.
Lemma 2. If (σ1, σ2) ∈ DE (θ1, θ2) then there exist actions a1, a
′
1 ∈ C (σ1) and a2, a
′
2 ∈ C (σ2)
such that: (a1, a2) ∈ DE (θ1, θ2), and (a
′
1, a
′
2) ∈ DE (θ1, θ2), with π (a1, a2) ≥ π (σ1, σ2), and
π (a′1, a
′
2) ≤ π (σ1, σ2).
Proof. Note that for any mixed deception equilibrium (σ1, σ2) and any action a ∈ C (σ2), the
profile (σ1, a) is also a deception equilibrium (because otherwise the deceiver would not induce the
deceived party to take a mixed action that puts positive weight on a). It follows that there are
actions a2, a
′
2 ∈ C (σ2) such that (σ1, a2) and (σ1, a
′
2) are deception equilibria, with π (σ1, a2) ≥
π (σ1, σ2) and π (σ1, a
′
2) ≤ π (σ1, σ2). Furthermore, if (σ1, a2) and (σ1, a
′
2) are deception equilibria,
then for any action a ∈ C (σ1), the profiles (a, a2) and (a, a
′
2) are also deception equilibria, with
π (σ1, a2) = π (a, a2) and π (σ1, a
′
2) = π (a, a
′
2). Hence there are actions a1, a
′
1 ∈ C (σ1) such
that (a1, a2) and (a
′
1, a
′
2) are deception equilibria, with π (a1, a2) = π (σ1, a2) ≥ π (σ1, σ2), and
π (a1, a
′
2) = π (σ1, a
′
2) ≤ π (σ1, σ2).
Assume that case (A) holds: there is an incumbent θ˚ that plays inefficiently against itself, i.e.(
bN
θ˚
(
θ˚
)
, bN
θ˚
(
θ˚
))
6= (a¯, a¯), and there is no incumbent type with a strictly higher cognitive level
than θ˚ that satisfies any of the cases (A), (B), or (C). To prove that this cannot hold in an NSC
we introduce a mutant θˆ = (uˆ, nθ˚) /∈ C (µ
∗) . If Σ (uθ˚) = ∆, then we let uˆ ∈ UGI be such that
θˆ = (uˆ, nθ˚) /∈ C (µ
∗). If Σ (uθ˚) 6= ∆, then we fix a dominated action a ∈ A\Σ (uθ˚), and let uˆ be
defined as follows:
uˆ (a, a′) =


maxa∈A (uθ˚ (a, a¯)) a = a
′ = a¯
uθ˚ (a, a
′)− βa′ a = a and a
′ 6= a¯
uθ˚ (a, a
′) otherwise,
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where each βa′ ≥ 0 is chosen such that θˆ = (uˆ, nθ˚) /∈ C (µ
∗). That is, if Σ (uθ˚) 6= ∆, then the
utility function uˆ is constructed from the utility function uθ˚ by arbitrarily lowering the payoff of
some of the outcomes associated with the (already) dominated action a and that do not involve
action a¯, while increasing the payoff of the outcome (a¯, a¯) by the minimal amount that makes
a¯ a best reply to itself. Note that this definition of uˆ is valid also for the case of a¯ = a. It
follows that a ∈ Σ (uθ˚) ∪ {a¯} iff a ∈ Σ (uˆ). To see this, note that if Σ (uθ˚) 6= ∆ and a = a¯, then
Σ (uˆ) = Σ (uθ˚) ∪ {a¯}. Otherwise Σ (uˆ) = Σ (uθ˚). Thus, θˆ can be induced to play exactly the same
pure actions as θ˚, unless a¯ = a, in which case θˆ can be induced to play a¯ in addition to all actions
that θ˚ can be induced to play.
Let µ′ be the distribution that assigns mass one to type (uˆ, nθ˚). Let the post-entry type
distribution be µ˜ = (1− ǫ) · µ∗ + ǫ · µ′, and let the post-entry behaviour policy b˜ be defined as
follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality: b˜Nθ (θ
′) = bNθ (θ
′) and b˜Dθ (θ
′) = bDθ (θ
′) ∀θ, θ′ ∈
C (µ∗).
2. In matches without deception between the mutant type θˆ and any incumbent type θ′,
the mutant θˆ mimics θ˚, and the incumbent θ′ treats the mutant θˆ like the incumbent θ˚:(
b˜N
θˆ
(θ′) , b˜Nθ′
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bN
θ˚
(θ′) , bNθ′
(
θ˚
))
for all θ′ such that nθ′ = nθ˚ and θ
′ 6= θˆ.
3. In matches with deception between the mutant type θˆ and any lower type θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) (with
nθ′ < nθˆ), we distinguish two cases.
(a) Suppose that Σ (uθ˚) = ∆. In this case let
(
b˜D
θˆ
(θ′) , b˜Dθ′
(
θˆ
))
∈ FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
. Note that
FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
is nonempty since in this case uˆ ∈ UGI .
(b) Suppose that Σ (uθ˚) 6= ∆. In this case let
(
b˜D
θˆ
(θ′) , b˜Dθ′
(
θˆ
))
= (a1, a2), for some (a1, a2) ∈
DE
(
θ˚, θ′
)
such that π (a1, a2) ≥ π
(
bD
θ˚
(θ′) , bDθ′
(
θ˚
))
. By Lemma 2 above such a profile
(a1, a2) exists.
4. The mutant plays efficiently when meeting itself: b˜N
θˆ
(
θˆ
)
= a¯.
5. In matches with deception between the mutant θˆ and a higher type θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) (nθ′ >
nθˆ), we distinguish two cases. Pick a profile (a1, a2) ∈ DE
(
θ′, θ˚
)
, such that π (a2, a1) ≥
π
(
bD
θ˚
(θ′) , bDθ′
(
θ˚
))
. By Lemma 2 above such a profile (a1, a2) exists. Moreover, by the
construction of uˆ, it is either the case that (a1, a2) ∈ DE
(
θ′, θˆ
)
, or there is some a˜ such that
uθ′ (a˜, a¯) > uθ′ (a1, a2). In the latter case we have (a¯, a¯) ∈ DE
(
θ′, θˆ
)
, due to the fact that(
bDθ′ (θ
′) , bDθ′ (θ
′)
)
= (a¯, a¯) implies that a¯ is a best reply to a¯ for type θ′.
(a) If uθ′ (a1, a2) > uθ′ (a¯, a¯) let
(
b˜Dθ′
(
θˆ
)
, b˜D
θˆ
(θ′)
)
= (a1, a2). Note that by the definition of
(a1, a2) it holds that π (a2, a1) ≥ π
(
bD
θ˚
(θ′) , bDθ′
(
θ˚
))
.
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(b) If uθ′ (a1, a2) ≤ uθ′ (a¯, a¯) let
(
b˜Dθ′
(
θˆ
)
, b˜D
θˆ
(θ′)
)
= (a¯, a¯). Note that by the definition of θ˚
it holds that π (a¯, a¯) ≥ π
(
bD
θ˚
(θ′) , bDθ′
(
θ˚
))
.
By point 1,
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ∗, b∗)). By point 2 the mutant θˆ
earns weakly more than θ˚ against lower types. By point 3 the mutant θˆ earns the same as θ˚
against all incumbents of level nθ˚. By points 3 and 4 (and the assumption that θ˚ does not play
efficiently against itself), the mutant θˆ earns strictly more than θ˚ against θˆ. By point 5 the mutant
θˆ earns weakly more than θ˚ against all incumbents of a higher cognitive level. In total the average
fitness earned by θˆ is strictly higher than that of θ˚, against a population that follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This
implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗ in the population game Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗ is not
a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS of Γ(µ˜,b˜), which implies that µ
∗ is
not an NSC. Thus we have shown that θ˚ plays efficiently against itself.
B Type-interdependent Preferences
As argued by Herold and Kuzmics (2009, pp. 542–543), people playing a game seem to care
not only about the outcome, but also their opponent’s intentions and they discriminate between
different types of opponents (for experimental evidence, see, e.g., Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher,
2003; Charness and Levine, 2007). Motivated by this observation, in this appendix we extend our
baseline model to allow preferences to depend not only on action profiles, but also on an opponent’s
type.
B.1 Changes to the Baseline Model
We briefly describe how to extend the model to handle type-interdependent preferences. Our
construction is similar to that of Herold and Kuzmics (2009).
When the preferences of a type depend on the opponent’s type, we can no longer work with
the set of all possible preferences, because it would create problems of circularity and cardinality.24
Instead, we must restrict attention to a pre-specified set of feasible preferences. We begin by
defining ΘID as an arbitrary set of labels. Each label is a pair θ = (u, n) ∈ ΘID, where n ∈ N and
u is a type-interdependent utility function that depends on the played action profile as well as the
opponent’s label, u : A× A×ΘID → R.
24The circularity comes from the fact that each type contains a preferences component, which is identified with
a utility function defined over types (and action profiles). To see that this creates a problem if the set of types is
unrestricted, let U∗ be the set of all utility functions that we want to include in our model. Hence Θ∗ = U∗ × N
is the set of all types. If U∗∗ is the set of all mappings u : A × A × Θ∗ → R, or, equivalently, U∗∗ is the set of all
mappings u : A × A × U∗ × N → R, then clearly we have U∗∗ 6= U∗. See also footnote 10 in Herold and Kuzmics
(2009).
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Each label θ = (u, n) may now be interpreted as a type. The definition of u extends to mixed
actions in the obvious way. We use the label u also to describe its associated utility function u.
Thus u (σ, σ′, θ′) denotes the subjective payoff that a player with preferences u earns when she
plays strategy σ against an opponent with type θ′ who plays strategy σ′.
Let UID denote the set of all preferences that are part of some type in ΘID, i.e. UID = {u :
∃n ∈ N s.t. (u, n) ∈ ΘID}. For each preference u˜ ∈ U of the baseline model (which is defined
only over the action profiles) we can define an equivalent type-interdependent preference u ∈ UID,
which is independent of the opponent’s type; that is, u (σ, σ′, θ′) = u (σ, σ′, θ′′) = u˜ (σ, σ′) for each
θ′, θ′′ ∈ ΘID and σ, σ
′ ∈ ∆(A). Let UN denote the set of all such type-interdependent versions of
the preferences of the baseline model. To simplify the statements of the results of Section B.3, in
what follows we assume that UN ⊆ UID.
Next, we amend the definitions of Nash equilibrium, undominated strategies, and deception
equilibrium. The best-reply correspondence now takes both strategies and types as arguments:
BRu (σ
′, θ′) = argmaxσ∈∆(A) u (σ, σ
′, θ′). Accordingly we adjust the definition of the set of Nash
equilibria,
NE (θ, θ′) = {(σ, σ′) ∈ ∆(A)×∆(A) : σ ∈ BRu (σ
′, θ′) and σ′ ∈ BRu′ (σ, θ)} ,
and the set of undominated strategies,
Σ (θ) = {σ ∈ ∆(A) : there exists σ′ ∈ ∆(A) and θ′ ∈ ΘID such that σ ∈ BRu (σ
′, θ′)} .
Finally, we adapt the definition of deception equilibrium. Given two types θ, θ′ with nθ > nθ′, a
strategy profile (σ˜, σ˜′) is a deception equilibrium if
(σ˜, σ˜′) ∈ arg max
σ∈∆(A),σ′∈Σ(θ′)
uθ (σ, σ
′, θ′) .
The interpretation of this definition is that the deceiver is able to induce both a belief about the
deceiver’s preferences, and a belief the deceiver’s intention, in the mind of the deceived party. Let
DE (θ, θ′) be the set of all such deception equilibria. The rest of our model remains unchanged.
Some of the following results rely on the existence of preferences ua˜a˜′,n˜ that satisfy two conditions:
(1) action a˜ is a (subjective) dominant action against an opponent with the same preferences
and with cognitive level n˜, and (2) action a˜′ is the dominant action against all other opponents.
Formally:
Definition 13. Given any two actions a˜, a˜′ ∈ A, let ua˜a˜′,n˜ be the discriminating preferences defined
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by the following utility function: for all a, a′ ∈ A and θ′ ∈ UID,
ua˜a˜′,n˜ (a, a
′, θ′) =


1
(
θ′ =
(
ua˜a˜′,n˜, n˜
)
and a = a˜
)
or
(
θ′ 6=
(
ua˜a˜′,n˜, n˜
)
and a = a˜′
)
0 otherwise.
Finally, define the effective cost of deceiving cognitive level n, denoted by c (n), as the minimal
ratio between the additional cognitive cost and the probability of deceiving an opponent of cognitive
level n:
c (n) = min
m>n
km − kn
q (m,n)
.
Note that c (1) ≡ c, which coheres with the definition of the effective cost of deception (with
respect to cognitive level 1) in the baseline model.
B.2 Pure Maxmin and Minimal Fitness
The pure maxmin and minmax values give a minimal bound to the fitness of an NSC. Given a
game G = (A, π) , define M and M¯ as its pure maxmin and minmax values, respectively:
M = max
a1∈A
min
a2∈A
π (a1, a2) , M = min
a2∈A
max
a1∈A
π (a1, a2) .
The pure maxmin value M is the minimal fitness payoff a player can guarantee herself in the
sequential game in which she plays first, and the opponent replies in an arbitrary way. The pure
minmax value M is the minimal fitness payoff a player can guarantee herself in the sequential
game in which her opponent plays first an arbitrary action, and she best-replies to the opponent’s
pure action. It is immediate that M ≤M and that the minmax value in mixed actions is between
these two values.
Let aM
¯
be a maxmin action of a player; i.e. an action aM
¯
guarantees that the player’s payoff
is at least M
¯
, and let aM¯ be a minmax action, i.e. an action that guarantees that the opponent’s
payoff is at most M¯ :
aM ∈ argmax
a1∈A
min
a2∈A
π (a1, a2) , aM¯ ∈ arg min
a2∈A
max
a1∈A
π (a1, a2) .
The proof of Proposition 3 holds with minor changes also in the setup of interdependent pref-
erences (under the assumption that (uaM , 1) ∈ ΘID), and this implies that the maxmin value is a
lower bound on the fitness payoff obtained in an NSC (i.e. if (µ, b) is an NSC then Π (µ, b) ≥M ).
B.3 Characterisation of Pure Stable Configurations
In this subsection we show that, essentially, a pure configuration is stable if and only if (1) all
incumbents have the same cognitive level n, (2) the cost of level n is smaller than the difference
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between the incumbents’ (fitness) payoff and the minmax/maxmin values, and (3) the deviation
gain is smaller than the effective cost of deceiving cognitive level n.
We begin by formally stating and proving the necessity claim.
Proposition 4. If (µ∗, a∗) is a pure NSC then the following holds: (1) if θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) then
nθ = nθ′ = n for some n, (2) π (a
∗, a∗)−M ≥ kn, and (3) g (a
∗) ≤ c (n).
Proof.
1. Since all players earn the same game payoff of π (a∗, a∗) , they must also incur the same
cognitive cost, or else the fitness of the different incumbent types would not be balanced
(which would contradict the fact that (µ, a∗) is an NSC).
2. Assume to the contrary that π (a∗, a∗) −M < kn. A mutant of type (π, 1) will be able to
earn at least M against incumbents in any post-entry focal configuration. As the fraction of
mutants vanishes the average fitness of mutants is weakly higher thanM , whereas the fitness
of the incumbents converges to π (a∗, a∗)−kn. Thus, if it were the case that π (a
∗, a∗)−M <
kn, then the mutants would outperform the incumbents.
3. Assume to the contrary that g (a∗) > c (n). This implies that there exists a cognitive level
m > n such that g (a∗) > km−kn
q(m,n)
. Let a˜ be the fitness best reply against a∗. Let u˜ ∈
UN be the preferences that assign a subjective payoff of one if the agent plays either a˜
or a∗ and the opponent plays a∗, and zero otherwise, i.e. u˜ (a, a′, θ′) = 1a∈{a∗,a˜} and a′=a∗ .
There is a focal post-entry configuration in which all agents play action a∗ in all interactions
except when a deceiving mutant plays action a˜. A mutant of type (u˜,m) will then earn
π (a∗, a∗) + g (a∗) · q (m,n) against the incumbents. As the fraction of mutants vanishes the
average fitness of mutants is weakly higher than
π (a∗, a∗) + g (a∗) · q (m,n)− km > π (a
∗, a∗) + (km − kn)− km = π (a
∗, a∗)− kn,
whereas the fitness of the incumbents is weakly below π (a∗, a∗) − kn. Thus, if it were true
that g (a∗) > c (n), the mutants would strictly outperform the incumbents.
Next, we state and prove the sufficiency claim.
Proposition 5. Suppose that θˆ :=
(
ua∗aM¯,n , n
)
∈ ΘID. If π (a
∗, a∗) −M > kn, and g (a
∗) < c (n),
then
(
θˆ, a∗
)
is an ESC.
Proof. Suppose that all incumbents are of type
(
ua∗aM¯,n, n
)
. Note that in all focal post-entry config-
urations the incumbent θˆ always plays either a∗ or aM¯ . Moreover, whenever an incumbent agent is
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non-deceived, then she plays action a∗ against a fellow incumbent and action aM¯ against a mutant.
The fact that π (a∗, a∗)−kn > M implies that any mutant θ 6= θˆ with cognitive level nθ′ ≤ n earns
a strictly lower payoff against the incumbents in any focal post-entry configuration. As a result,
if the frequency of mutants is sufficiently small, then they are strictly outperformed. Against a
mutant (θ′, n′) with cognitive level n′ > n, an incumbent may play action a∗ only when she is being
deceived. Since π (a∗, a∗) > M the mutants earn (on average) at most π (a∗, a∗) + g (a∗) · q (n′, n)
in matches against incumbents. Consequently, as the fraction of mutants vanishes, the average
fitness of mutants is weakly less than
π (a∗, a∗) + g (a∗) · q (n′, n)− kn′ < π (a
∗, a∗) +
kn′ − kn
q (n′, n)
· q (n′, n)− kn′ = π (a
∗, a∗)− kn,
and the average fitness of the incumbents converges to π (a∗, a∗) − kn. Hence, the mutants are
outperformed.
In particular, our results imply that:
1. Any pure equilibrium that induces a payoff above the minmax value M is the outcome of a
pure ESC (regardless of the cost of deception).
2. If the effective cost of deception is sufficiently small, then only Nash equilibria can be the
outcomes of pure NSCs. Specifically, this is the case if c (n) < g (a) for each cognitive level
n and each action a such that (a, a) is not a Nash equilibrium of the fitness game.
3. If there is a cognitive level n, such that (1) the cost of achieving level n is sufficiently
small, and (2) the effective cost of deceiving an opponent of level n is sufficiently high,
then essentially any pure profile is the outcome of a pure ESC (similar to the results of
Herold and Kuzmics, 2009, in the setup without deception). Formally, let A′ ⊆ A be the
set of actions that induce a payoff above the minmax value: A′ =
{
a ∈ A|π (a, a) > M¯
}
.
Assume that there is a cognitive level n, such that (1) kn < π (a, a) − M¯ for each action
a ∈ A′ and (2) c (n) > g (a) for each action a. Then any action a ∈ A′ is the outcome of a
pure ESC (in which all incumbents have cognitive level n).
B.4 Application: In-group Cooperation and Out-group Exploitation
The following table represents a family of Hawk-Dove games. When both players play D (Dove)
they earn 1 each and when they both play H (Hawk) they earn 0. When a player plays H against
an opponent playing D, she obtains an additional gain of g > 0 and the opponent incurs a loss of
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l ∈ (0, 1).
H D
H 0, 0 1 + g, 1− l
D 1− l, 1 + g 1, 1
. (1)
It is natural to think of a mutual play of D as the cooperative outcome. We define preferences
that induce players to cooperate with their own kind and to seek to exploit those who are not of
their own kind.
Definition 14. Let un denote the preferences such that:
1. If uθ′ = u
n and nθ′ = n then u
n (D, a′, θ′) = 1 and un (H, a′, θ′) = 0 for all a′.
2. If uθ′ 6= u
n or nθ′ 6= n then u
n (H, a′, θ′) = 1 and un (D, a′, θ′) = 0 for all a′.
Thus, when facing someone who is of the same type, an individual with un-preferences strictly
prefers cooperation, in the sense of playing D. When facing someone who is not of the same type,
an individual with un-preferences strictly prefers the aggressive action H .
To simplify the analysis and the notation in this example we assume that a player always
succeeds in deceiving an opponent with a lower cognitive level; i.e. we assume that q (n, n′) = 1
whenever n>n′.
Under the assumption that g > l and that the marginal cognitive costs are sufficiently small
(but non-vanishing), we construct an ESC in which only individuals with preferences from {ui}∞i=1
are present. Individuals of different cognitive levels coexist, and non-Nash profiles are played in all
matches between equals. When individuals of the same level meet, they play mutual cooperation
(D,D). When individuals of different levels meet, the higher level plays H and the lower level plays
D. The gain from obtaining the high payoff of 1+g against lower types is exactly counterbalanced
by the higher cognitive costs. By contrast, if g < l then the game does not admit this kind of
stable configuration.
Proposition 6. Let G be the game represented in (1), where g > 0 and l ∈ (0, 1). Assume that
q (n, n′) = 1 whenever n 6= n′. Suppose that the marginal cognitive cost is small but non-vanishing,
so that (a) there is an N such that kN ≤ l+g < kN+1, and (b) it holds that g > kn+1−kn for all n ≤
N .
(i) If g > l then there exists an ESC (µ∗, b∗), such that C (µ∗) ⊆ {(un, n)}Nn=1, and µ
∗ is mixed
(i.e. |C (µ∗)| > 1). The behaviour of the incumbents is as follows: if the individuals in a match
are of different cognitive levels, then the higher level plays H and the lower level plays D; if both
individuals in a match are of the same cognitive level, then they both play D.
(ii) If g = l then there exists an NSC with the above properties.
(iii) If g < l then there does not exist any NSC (µ∗, b∗), such that C (µ∗) ⊆ {(un, n)}∞n=1.
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The formal proof is presented in Appendix C.
Remark 8. It is possible to construct an ESC that is like Proposition 6(i) except that when in-
cumbents of the same cognitive level meet they play the mixed equilibrium of the Hawk-Dove
game. Thus we can have ESCs in which agents mix at the individual level. For instance, this
can be accomplished by considering preferences um such that: (1) if uθ′ = u
m and nθ′ = n then
um (a, a′, θ′) = π (a, a′, θ′) for all a and a′, and (2) if uθ′ 6= u
m or nθ′ 6= n then u
n (H, a′, θ′) = 1 and
un (D, a′, θ′) = 0 for all a′.
C Constructions of Heterogeneous NSCs in Examples
Appendix C appears in the supplementary material that can be found online.
D Partial Observability When There Is No Deception
Appendix D appears in the supplementary material that can be found online.
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